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Chapter 1
BRECKINRIDGE LONG

Breckinridge Long became the head of the Special War
Problems Division of the State Department in January
1940.

He took the post of Assistant Secretary of State

recently vacated by George Messersmith when the latter
became the ambassador to Cuba.:

The War Problems

Division was established in January 1940 and included
supervision of the Visa Division."
Secretary,

therefore,

The new Assistant

was charged with handling all

problems related to refugees including formulating
policies to determine who and how many of those seeking
freedom from persecution would be permitted refuge in the
United States.
Long's credentials were impressive.
St.

Louis,

Born in 1881 in

Missouri and the descendent of the

'Extract from Memorandum of Secretary Hull's Press
Conference, 5 January 1940, container 202, Papers of
Breckinridge Long, Library of Congress.
Hereafter
referred to as Long Papers.
-Richard Breitmann and Alan M. Kraut, American
Refugee Policy and European Jewry, 1933-1945
(Bloomington:
University of Indiana Press, 1987), 126.
1

2
distinguished Long family of North Carolina and the
equally respectable Breckinridge family of Kentucky,

Long

graduated from Princeton University in 1904 and was
admitted to law practice in Missouri in 1906.

After an

unsuccessful attempt to gain election to the Missouri
State Assembly in 1908,

Long returned to the study of

constitutional law at Princeton,
Woodrow Wilson,

taking courses from

and received his master's degree from

Princeton in 1909.

His return to Missouri politics was

enhanced by his marriage to the granddaughter of Francis
Preston Blair,

a leader of the Jacksonian wing of the

Democratic party in the mid-nineteenth century,

and by

his early support of Woodrow Wilson in the campaign for
the Presidency in 1912.

Although opposed by William

Jennings Bryan in his bid to gain an appointment as Third
Assistant Secretary of State,
Following Bryan's resignation.
upward swing,

Long bided his time.
Long's career took an

undoubtedly aided by a loan of $100,000

that he gave to the almost bankrupt Democratic National
Committee in 1916.

Long's reward was an appointment as

the Third Secretary of State in 1917.

After three years

of diligent work in the State Department and careful
recruitment of several young Missouri Democrats to
federal positions in Washington,
Wilsonian,

Long,

the faithful

resigned from the State Department in order to

3
campaign for the League of Nations and attempt to win a
seat in the U.

S.

Senate in 1920.

Long left Missouri

politics following his defeat and "retired"
where he devoted his time to travel,
Party affairs,

to Maryland

national Democratic

and the breeding and racing of horses.

In

1930 he met and became a supporter of Franklin Delano
Roosevelt and contributed heavily to Roosevelt's preconvention campaign in 1932.

He was rewarded with an

appointment as the Ambassador to Italy in 1933,
that he held until 1936.

He remained

a post

in semi-retirement

for almost four years.3
During his service as Ambassador to Italy,
evolved from a novice to a seasoned diplomat.

Long
At first

he wrote to Roosevelt about being "part of a big show"4
in which he met monarchs and princes.

Long's naivete led

him at first to endorse the Italian corporate state as
the "most interesting experiment in government"

since the

3

Fred L. Israel, ed.. The War Diary of Breckinridqe
Long:
Selections From the Years 1939-1944 (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1966), xi-xxv.
Hereafter
referred to as Israel, ed.. War Diary.
4

Long .to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1 June 1933,
container 105, Long Papers.
Mrs. Long, whom William E.
Dodd, the Ambassador to Germany, described as "a
descendant of the famous Blair family . . . and very
conscious of the fact," entertained lavishly, and both
Longs seemed impressed by the fact that they were
included in the high social circles of Fascist Italy.
William E. Dodd, Jr. and Martha Dodd, Ambassador Dodd's
Diary, 1933-1938 (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company,
1941), 11-12.

4
founding of the U.

S.

government in the 18th century and

to praise Mussolini as an "outstanding character" who had
brought law,
later,

order,

however.

and cleanliness to Italy.5

Two years

Long's opinion about the Fascists had

changed and he described them as a group who were
"deliberate,
vicious."6

determined,

obdurate,

ruthless,

and

Illness required a return to the United

States for an operation and forced Long to vacate his
post in Italy,

but Roosevelt clearly indicated that he

wanted Long to continue in his second administration once
Long was well.7
Long's position as Assistant Secretary and
particularly as the Director of the Special War Problems
Division of the State Department provides an ample
opportunity to analyze the implementation of U.

S.

immigration and refugee policies between 1940 and 1944
(when the War Refugee Board was created).

Although his

appointment was at first a personal disappointment
because he had wanted a cabinet level post,

Long readily

accepted the offer to fill the Assistant Secretary

5

Long to Roosevelt,
Papers.

1 June 1933,

container 105,

Long

6

6 September 1935,

7

22 June 1936,

Long to Franklin D. Roosevelt,
container 115, Long Papers.
Franklin D. Roosevelt to Long,
container 117, Long Papers.

5
appointment.8

He was pleased with the opportunity

finally to be in a position to have a hand in the
determination of State Department policy,9 but he was not
happy with his responsibilities regarding refugee issues.
He described those responsibilities as the "worst job in
Government" and he would continue to maneuver for a
better position in the State Department.10
In the beginning of his term as Assistant Secretary,
Long was ambivalent in his opinions about the
authoritarian regimes of Italy and Germany.

While he did

not depart from his belief that Mussolini and the
Fascists were "obdurate,

ruthless,

and vicious," Long

still admired the ability of the Fascists and Nazis to
mobilize their people.

The Germans,

he wrote in 1938,

were the only people with the "intelligence,

courage,

and

8

Both Sumner Welles and Cordell Hull supported
Long's appointment as the Assistant Secretary because
they were impressed with the work that he had done for
the Department in regard to the attempts by the Special
Problems Division in 193 9 to promote peace with Italy and
to stabilize the international trade situation.
Memorandum of Breckinridge Long, Assistant Secretary of
State, 1944, container 204, Long Papers.
See also Long
Diary, 31 March 1939, container 5, Long Papers. The
portion of Longs' diary pertinent to this paper is in
container 5; therefore all future references
will be
labeled as Long Diary.
9

,Israel, ed.. War Diary,
1939 and 27 July 1939.
10

Long Diary,

1944 .

xxiv;

Long Diary,

13 and 26 September 1943,

31 March

24 January

6
obedience sufficient to bring order,

system and

comparative peace in that whole country lying between the
Rhine and the Black Sea

[sic] ."11

His political thinking

after 1938 closely resembled the appeasement approach of
the Cliveden set in Britain which hoped that Nazi Germany
would concentrate its attention on Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union.

In February 193 9 he wrote in his diary

that Hitler did not want a war with France but was
instead more interested in moving eastward because "no
one is going to fight him there."12

As late as June 1939

Long still believed that the United States should take a
careful approach in its diplomacy with Germany lest it
become the "champion of a defeated cause."13
It appeared that Long was willing to accept almost
anything but war with Germany.

He privately labelled

Roosevelt's criticism of Hitler's expansionism as
"terrible,"

something that

"will get us into war."

also questioned the efficacy of an embargo on steel,
and iron to Japan,
Held the Dagger"

Lend Lease,

and Roosevelt's

"ibid., 13 March 1938.
12

Ibid. , 3 February 1939.

Ibid.,

14

Ibid.,

oil,

"Hand That

speech condemning Italy for its actions

against France.14

13

He

13 June 1939.
16 June,

12 November 1940.

7
Long and his associates were in close agreement on
the issue of the refugees.

His determination to analyze

every word of an immigrant's credentials,
was sustained by his subordinates,
"suave anti-Semites."
article,

for example,

viewed by some as

In their New York Evening Post

journalists Tabitha Petain and William Walton

wrote that Long readily admitted that Consuls Leland
Morris in Berlin and James Stewart in Zurich were antiSemites who were loathe to issue visas to Jews.
Petain and Walton noted.

Yet,

Long did nothing in the period

before the entry of the United States into the War to
remove the two Consuls from their important positions.15
In another instance,

Avra Warren,

Division of the State Department,

the head of the Visa
opposed the settlement

of 12,000 Jewish refugees in the underpopulated Virgin
Islands on the ground that many were either subversives
or operatives of the German government.

He also opposed

the use of Alaska as a possible site for Jewish refugees
because they were all of the same background and might
therefore cause trouble.16
assistant,

Robert Alexander,

Warren's

held similar views regarding Jewish refugees.

He consistently opposed the creation from unused quotas

15

11 February 1941,

16

New York Evening Post,

7.

Long Memorandum, 13 November, container 211,
Papers.
Avra Warren to Hackworth, Legal Division,
February 1941, ibid.

Long
9

8
of what he termed in 1944

"a jackpot for the Jews."17

The year before Alexander had suggested to Long that the
Jews in the United States were unwittingly helping Hitler
by interfering with the success of the Allied war effort
by their unreasonable refugee demands.18

George Brant,

Long's executive assistant and delegate to the 1938 Evian
Refugee Conference and the 1943 Bermuda Conference,
expressed similar sentiments.

Brant and Elbridge Durbow,

Chief of the State Department's European Division,

would

not give credence to reports of mass exterminations in
Europe.

And,

finally,

R.

Borden Reams,

who became as

early as 1942 Long's principal advisor on the Jewish
refugee situation in the European Division of the State
Department,

apparently convinced Long that many of the

refugees who came to the United States were in actuality
spies for the Nazis.19
There appeared to be little difference between
the State Department refugee policy and the personalities
and ideologies of Long and his assistants.

17

2 February 1944,

18

7 May 1943,

Alexander to Long,
Long Papers.
Alexander to Long,
Papers.

The policy

container 215,

container 203,

Long

"Although Reams' influence is not specifically
cited. Long closely followed the logic and wording that
Reams used in his recommendations to Long.
See American
Minutes of the Bermuda Conference sessions, 25 April
1943, container 202, Long Papers.

9
followed by Long in the State Department

(and he

considered himself the "policy making and the executive
agent of the Government"

in matters relating to

refugees)20 was one which closed the door to refugees,
children as well as adults,

who were attempting to flee

from Nazi terrorism.
Evidence supports the suspicion that Long did not
need much persuasion from his subordinates to accept the
fact that the admission of a large number of Jewish
refugees in the United States would be dangerous to the
nation.

Following his reading of Mein Kampf in 1938,

Long wrote in his diary that Hitler was

"eloquent in

opposition to Jewry and the Jews as exponents of
Communism and chaos"
Secretary,

[italics mine].21

As Assistant

Long modified the rhetoric but not the essence

of his feelings about the Jews.

He consistently

complained in his diary about the "radical boys" who were
"refugee enthusiasts" and labeled them as

[Felix]

"Frankfurter's boys" because they were "representative of
his racial group and philosophy"

20Long Diary,
21

Ibid. ,

22

[italics mine] .22

29 December 1940.

6 February 1938.

Ibid., 15 February 1941,
September 1943.

9 December 1942,

and 4

10
There also is evidence that Long became increasinglyconvinced of a concerted effort afoot to undermine his
authority and influence within the Roosevelt
administration. This might have been expected after
several years of dealing with the complex problem of the
refugees and their advocates,

but Long expressed his

suspicions almost from the beginning.

He complained in

his diary in 1940 that the "attack in the newspapers
still seems to continue against me little by little and
indicate that the wild-eyed elements have marked me out
as their objective."23
that Rabbi Wise,

A year later Long was convinced

Attorney General Francis Biddle,

and

James McDonald of the President's Advisory Committee on
Political Refugees
destroy" him,

(PACPR),

"in their eagerness to

were ready to "throw him to the wolves."

He was certain that they would "try in the future as they
have in the past"

to destroy him and "ruin" his

"political status."24

In that same 1941 diary entry,

Long wrote that despite his exhaustion he would continue
to battle against his enemies despite the fact that
one of these men
because.
person,

[Wise,

Long explained,
everywhere,

McDonald,

they believed that

9 December 1940.

24

4 September 1941.

Ibid.,

hate me"

"every

has a right to come to the United

23

Ibid.,

and Biddle]

"each

States" while he believed that

"nobody,

anywhere has a

right to enter the United States unless the United States
desires . "2S
Long was convinced that many of the people who
entered the United States,
City,

especially by way of New York

were the supporters of ideas that were definitely

un-American and he had no doubt,

he wrote in his diary,

that they were not like the people with whom he
associated and worked.26

Described by Saul Friedman in

No Haven For The Oppressed as a "wizened" man who
"possessed little fondness for the common man or the
foreigner,"27 Long evoked strong reactions from those who
had to deal with him.
that James MacDonald,

For example.

Long himself wrote

the Chairman of the PACPR,

walked

out of an October 1940 meeting with Long after he accused
Long of having a "vindictive mentality and superlative
ego."28

[sic]

Tabitha Petain and William Walton,

in

25

Ibid.
Long did not hide his feelings.
At a
meeting with Rabbi Wise, Biddle, the Roman Catholic
Archbishop of New Orleans, McDonald, and President
Roosevelt, Long openly opposed their position that more
refugees should be allowed to enter the United States.
Roosevelt remained quiet on the issue.
Ibid.
26

Ibid.,

16 December 1940.

27

Saul Friedman, No Haven for the Oppressed: United
States Policy Toward Jewish Refugees (Detroit: Wayne
State University Press, 1973), 114-115.
28

Long Diary,

3 October 1940.

12
their New York Evening Post article,
"narrow,

limited,

man,

described Long as a

whose wealth and inclination have

kept him from ever having any sympathy for the people who
get pushed around."

Although they conceded that he "may

no longer admire the fascist way of life"
they also wrote that his
made

[italic added],

"contempt for the little people"

"his holding of any government position a danger to

American democracy"

[italic added].29

Opinions differ regarding Long's motives in those
crucial four years in which he engaged in the "war in the
immigration fight."

There are those who have claimed

that Long exhibited at times an extreme paranoia in
conjunction with a dislike for and suspicion of refugees
in general.30
One thing is certain:

for Long the key could be

found in the phrase "observing the requirements of our
law."

The law prevailed even in the case of refugee

29

New York Evening Post,

30

11 February 1941,

7.

Friedman, No Haven, 118; Henry L. Feingold, The
Politics of Rescue: The Roosevelt Administration and the
Holocaust New York: Holocaust Library, 1980), 135; David
S. Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews: America and the
Holocaust, 1941-1945 (New York: Pantheon Press, 1985),
191; Brietmann and Kraut, American Refugee Policy , 126127; Yehuda Bauer. The Holocaust in Historical
Perspective (Seattle: University of Washington Press,
1978), 78, [Bauer went as far as to describe Long as a
"pathological antisemite," 215] ; Deborah Lipstadt, in
Beyond Belief: The American Press and the Coming of the
Holocaust. 1933-1945 (New York: The Free Press, 1986) .

13
children.31

He was against legislation which would amend

the Neutrality Act and allow American vessels to bring
children from Britain or "war stricken areas" because
this would have enabled children from other countries as
well to be brought to the United States and,

he

concluded, would lead to the "vitiation of our
immigration laws."32
that Long's

Indeed,

Saul Friedman has contended

"rigid adherence"

to the law was one of the

major reasons why the Jewish community grew to dislike
Long and see him as their enemy.33

31See Long Diary,
32

Long Diary,

33

Friedman,

19 June 1940 and 12 July 1940.

13 August 1940.

No Haven,

117.

Chapter 2
IMMIGRATION POLICY

Breckinridge Long was not the inventor of the United
States policy on immigration.

The policy he inherited

had been in a process of development since the last
quarter of the nineteenth century and it is the subject
of this chapter.

The modifications that were made during

Long's tenure as Assistant Secretary of State will be
discussed in subsequent chapters.
Prior to the twentieth century the flow of
immigrants into American depended more upon the economic
situation of Europe and the United States than upon any
legislative limitations imposed by the United States
Congress.

Immigration was thought of as a natural process

which aided the immigrant and the American society as
well.

It was not until 1882 that Congress,

following the

lead of several individual state legislatures,
certain types of immigrants
and paupers).

(convicts,

Three years later,

14

excluded

lunatics,

idiots,

Congress extended the

15
restriction of immigrants to contract labor immigrants as
well.1
The restriction of Oriental immigration was the
first definite change in the American policy of free
immigration.2

Although the initial arguments used for

Asiatic exclusion were economic,
delivered in "racial"

terms.3

the rationale was soon
This was also the first

time either race or ethnic identity was used as a means
to exclude a group of people from immigration,

an

argument which was later used in an attempt to bar
immigration from eastern and southern Europe.4
During the 1890s demand for immigration restriction
increased.

This increase was based on ethnic as well as

economic grounds.

The passage of the Literacy Test Act

of 1917 was the movement's first success and marked a
transition in the laws governing American immigration.
Although appearing to conform to the idea of individual

■'Roy Garis, Immigration Restriction (New York: The
Macmillan Co., 1927), 88; George M. Stephenson, A History
of American Immigration (New York:
Ginn and Company,
1926), 143.
2

William S. Bernard, American Immigration Policy:
A
Reappraisal (New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1950), 7, 8,
11.
3

Garis,
18-23 .
4

Immigration Restriction.

290-91;

M. R. Coolidge, Chinese Immigration
Henry Holt & Co., 1909), 96.

see also

(New York:

16
selection by requiring the applicant simply to meet a
standard of literacy,

its purpose clearly was to reduce

the number of certain immigrants into the country5 -specifically those from southeastern Europe where the
illiteracy rate was high.6

Immigration restriction was

supported by both political parties and by many of the
leaders in the American business community.
President Wilson twice

(1915,

1917)

similar to the literacy test bill,7
the idea of
the

"100 per cent American"

Although

vetoed measures
he also proclaimed
in warning against

"hyphenated" American who might have dual loyalty.
"Return to Normalcy" was the slogan that defined the

early years of the 1920s.
several interpretations,
William S.

The term has been given
and in the realm of immigration

Bernard described it as a "return to the

conservatism and traditionalism of the closed society and
to a climate of opinion extraordinarily favorable to the
reversal of our historic open-door policy of
immigration."

5

This normalcy,

Henry Pratt Fairchild,
Macmillan Co., 1925), 383.

according to Bernard,

Immigration

(New York:

The

Robert A. Divine, American Immigration Policy
Haven:
Yale University Press, 1957), 5.

(New

s

7

Stephenson,

A History of Immigration,

153,

166-69.

17
resulted in the Quota Law and the National Origins Law.8
The adoption of the quota system in the 1920s was the
result of the movement for the restriction of emigration
to the United States,

the increasing sentiment for

"independent internationalism," and the general feeling
of insecurity in the years following World War I.
The quota system formed only one part of the total
immigration policy and was established to operate in
conjunction with the basic immigration law of 1917.
Another important regulatory device was the visa
requirement of the State Department also included in the
1924 Act.
a visa,

According to that law,

immigrants must secure

a process requiring documentation with respect to

identity,

character,

applicant.

and the financial standing of the

This proved itself an effective means of

screening immigrants,

but the requirements also increased

bureaucratic entanglement.9

Indeed,

such entanglements

became extremely frustrating to those who needed
immediate attention,

such as during the years of Nazi

domination of Europe.
The years prior to World War II saw a slight
increase in the number of immigrants who came to the

8

Bernard, American Immigration Policy:
Reappraisal, 19.
9

Ibid. ,

30.

A

18
United States,
the Nazis.

reflecting the discriminatory policies of

There was not,

however,

a change in the

immigration policy of the United States.

Even the

provision which required guarantees from immigrant
sponsors

(individual and group)

public charges was maintained,

against refugees becoming
and between 1933 and 1944

less than 250,000 refugees were admitted to this
country.10

This number represents the smallest flow of

immigration for any comparable period since 1830.11
If the intent of the National Origins Act was to
reduce immigration,

then it achieved its goal.

But,

like

most laws,

it managed to create problems while meeting

its goal.

The official quota system simply ignored the

political realities of Europe.

The law was not flexible

enough to address those realities.

By permitting only a

10 percent increase of a country's quota in any one month
and by forbidding the transfer of unused quota from other
countries from year to year,
adhered to,

the law,

proved to be a tragedy during the years of

Nazi persecution.

This lack of flexibility resulted in

quotas remaining largely unused.

10

Ibid. ,

when strictly

William Bernard has

33.

"Maurice A. Davie, Refugees in America
Harper and Brothers, 1947), 33-36.

(New York:

19
insisted that this was the greatest failure of the
National Origins Act.12
There were other limitations to the National Origins
Act.

It failed to consider the changes in populations

and boundaries that took place between the wars.

It

never defined what the characteristics should be for a
prospective U.S.

citizen other than they should not be

public charges.
And,

most importantly,

Bernard claims,

the law gave

government sanction to an unscientific and
dangerous racialist [sic] doctrine.
It allows
'nativist' enemies of our democracy to carry on
their subversive activities under the cloak of
government policy.
At home the law makes for
disunity rather than for unity, and abroad it
exposes us to the charge of hypocrisy before
the nations of the world for our failure to
translate democratic principles into
practice.13
The law was based upon an interpretation that relied upon
the concept of

"differential assimilation," a concept

which argued that some ethnic groups

(meaning those from

the northern and western parts of Europe)

possessed a

superior ability to adapt to the society of the United
States.

No reputable studies exist supporting such an

assumption. Moreover,

the concept was based upon the

erroneous belief that assimilation and adaptation meant

12

Bernard,

13

Ibid. ,

American Immigration Policy,

262.

260-61.

20
the complete loss of the cultural identity by those who
were "assimilated."14
Actually,

1929 was a turning point in relation to

the immigration policy of the United States.
Depression created a different criteria,

The

one that was

based more upon economic considerations than cultural
ones.

Many of those who had opposed immigration

restriction reluctantly concluded that restriction was
perhaps necessary.

They agreed with the restrictionists

that the flow of immigrants should be reduced,
the inception of new and harsher laws.

but not by

These new

restrictionists favored strict enforcement of the
existing laws to achieve similar ends.15

The importance

in the methods suggested by each of these two groups
sJnould not go unnoticed.

Further restriction by

legislative act could have resulted in a permanent policy
while administrative policy changes which were
restrictive could be modified should the economic
situation improve.

A bill was proposed by the extreme

retrictionists which would have lowered the quota.

It

was actively opposed by several Jewish organizations and
President Herbert Hoover,

who had previously submitted

the problem to the State Department,

"Ibid.,
15

Divine,

had decided to

265.
American Immigration Policy,

77.

21
restrict immigration through adherence to existing
administrative policies.

The bill failed.16

Rigid adherence could,
negative effect.

however,

have its own

Consuls now interpreted the

"likely to

become a public charge" clause of the 1917 Act as to mean
only the most prosperous European emigrants.17
policy had a drastic result.
following year,
90 percent.18

This

By February of the

European immigration had been reduced by
A year later,

however,

Samuel

Dickstein,19 Chairman of the House Immigration Committee,
attempted to get a bill passed that would have created a
federal board to review cases of immigrants who had been
denied entrance but who had relatives in the United
States.20

The bill did not become law,

Department,

but the State

sensitive to criticism that it was receiving,

liberalized its policies concerning prospective

16

Ibid. ,

17

85.

New York Times,

18

Divine,

19

10 September 1930,

American Immigration Policy,

Conqressional Record

20

1.
78-79.

(6 January 1931):

1501.

"Review of the Action of Consular Officers in
Refusing Immigration Visas," Hearings Before the
Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, House of
Representatives, 72nd Congress, 1st Session, (1932), 2-7,
9, 10; Regarding Dickstein see also New York Times, 12
October 1931, 18.

22
immigrants who had relatives in the United States.21
This was not,
policy,

for,

however,

a major change in State Department

other than a "slight relaxation"

in 1937 of

its policy concerning the interpretation of its
charge" policy,

"public

the State Department retained a policy of

strict adherence to administrative procedures through the
remainder of the decade.22
These,

then were some of the problems that refugees

from Nazi persecution faced.

Until 1935,

however, many

German Jews felt little need to worry personally about
the refugee policies of the United States.

The passage

of the Nuremburg Laws in 1935 caused many German Jews to
reconsider their situation.

Initially,

little

apprehension was felt by German Jews who wished to
emigrate because there was a network of Jewish
organizations in Germany,

Palestine,

and the United

States available to help those who wished to leave
Germany.

Most of the leaders of these organizations

believed that the problem of emigration could be solved
in approximately fifteen years.

It soon became apparent

21

Ibid., 11-14; Congressional Record (1 June 1932),
11, 715; State Department, Press Release 10 (14 April
1934) : 204 .
"Congressional Record (23 January 1939): 609;
"Deportation of Aliens," Hearings Before a Subcommittee
of the Committee on Immigration, United States Senate,
1st Session, (21-23 March 1939): 71.
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that the task was greater than anticipated.23

German

laws made it difficult for Jews to leave the country and
take their wealth with them.

Nations which previously

had received Jewish immigrants now placed barriers of red
tape in the way of refugees.

Resettlement became less

attainable.24
Despite these difficulties,

the hope for

resettlement remained at least until the pogrom of 9
November 1938.

Kristallnacht,

the Night of Broken Glass,

could not be ignored as a simple aberration.
Kristallnacht left few Jews in Germany untouched and the
results -- physical,
disastrous.25

psychological,

and material -- were

Efforts toward the organization of Jewish

emigration either were blocked by Nazi officials or

23

"German Economic Notes.
Forfeiture of Possessions
by Jewish Emigrants."
Dispatch from Harrison Lewis,
Legation Secretary, Bern Switzerland, 14 January 1942.
container 202, Long Papers; see also Sir John Hope
Simpson, The Refugee Problem:
A Report of a Survey
(London:
Royal Institute of International Affairs and
Oxford University Press, 1939), 135, 146.
24

Lewis and Marian Shibsby, "Status of the Refugee
Under the American Immigration Laws," The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Sciences 203
(May 193 9): 76.
25

Sir John Hope Simpson, Refugees:
A Review of the
Situation Since September 1938 (New York:
Farrar and
Rinehart, Inc., 1939), 111.
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failed in the confusion and hysteria of the next few
weeks .26
When Germany occupied Austria and Czechoslovakia in
1938 and 1939,

close to 300,000 non-German Jews came

under Nazi control.

The number of Jews who left Germany

between 1933 and 1938 is estimated to be 150, 000.27
Following Nazi occupation of Austria and Czechoslovakia
through 1939,

the number became nearly 400,000 refugees,

according to League of Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees,

Sir Herbert Emerson. Of this 400,000,

were Jewish with 215,000 from Germany,
Austria,

329,000

97,000 from

and 17,000 from Czechoslovakia.28

Germany continued to expand through Europe,

And,

as Nazi

the problem

became only more nightmarish.29
Increasingly European Jews no longer had a place to
go on the continent.

If they fled eastward they often

faced a treatment as dangerous as the one they were

26

For Nazi pressure upon Jews to emigrate
immediately, New York Times, 27 April 1938, 11.
27

Erika Mann and Eric Estorick, "Private and
Governmental Aid of Refugees,"
Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Sciences 2 03 (May 193 9):
41.
28

Tartakower and Grossmann,

29

The Jewish Refugee,

32.

Simpson, The Refugee Problem, 126, 136.
In despair
many Jews committed suicide; see New York Times, 23 March
1938, 8.
Many Jews were exiled from the Reich without
proper papers or supplies. See New York Times, 3 April
1938, 1, 36; 20 April 1938, 1; 21 April 1938, 10, 18.
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attempting to escape.
only in degree:

In the west the situation differed

in France,

Jews were treated as

which interned 15,000 in 1939,

"enemy aliens;" Great Britain

interned another 27,000

"enemy aliens"

[Jewish refugees

fleeing Nazi Germany and Nazi gained territory]
the collapse of France in 1940.30

during

The United States

toughened its alien registration procedure,

especially

following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
Prior to World War I the United States had been able
to absorb vast numbers of refugees because of its immense
resources and extensive and developed productive economy.
Following World War I an unfavorable economic climate
combined with an increasing American nativism contributed
to a restrictive immigration policy.

Although American

nativism showed no abatement in the late 193 0s,
economic situation improved dramatically.

the

The economic

situation in the United States improved enough by the
beginning of the war in 1939 to render moot the argument
of the restrictionist whose opposition had been based
solely on economic grounds.

An argument was made that

the thousands of refugees who wished to enter the United

30

Tartakower and Grossmann,

The Jewish Refugee,

33.
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States could contribute significantly to the labor force
that was needed to meet the demands placed by war.31
One characteristic of past Jewish immigration to the
United States,

however,

served as a deterrent.

Jewish immigrants settled in large cities,

Past

particularly

New York City where two million of the seven million
inhabitants were Jews.32

The question became how many

more Jews New York City either could absorb or was
willing to absorb.

Accordingly, most of the refugee aid

societies encouraged settlement throughout the United
States and not just in the large urban centers.33
Readjustment by refugees to the United States was a
"stubborn problem."
Palestine,

There was no program,

as in

designed to help the refugee move into another

occupation. Also,

refugees who came to the United States

tended to be older,
professions,

more concentrated in the white collar

and less willing than those who emigrated to

Palestine to change occupations.

Another acute problem

was the fact that millions of Germans had settled in
America and many of these resided in the same communities

31

New York Times,
10.
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32
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Long Papers.
33
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Long Diary,

11;

11 January 1944,
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Container 5,

Dan Rosenberg, "Resettling German Refugees Outside
of New York," The Jewish Social Service Quarterly 4
(December 1938):
254 ff.
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as the Jewish refugees.

The Jewish refugees considered

those German immigrants as their "ideological enemies"
since many of the German immigrants had achieved
substantial success,
political

exerted a considerable amount of

"influence," and were the source of a

considerable portion of the anti-refugee propaganda in
the United States.

Although the outbreak of the war

quelled some of the activities of the German immigrants,
it did not erase completely the influence of the German
immigrant community.34
The logistical problems were not insurmountable.
The highly developed social work organizations,
particularly the special refugee-serving institutions,
were common in the American Jewish community and had
successfully served to facilitate the adjustment process
for immigrants in the past.

These organizations could

have coped with the non-German Jewish refugee problem.
The local and federated landsmannschaften also played an
important role in aiding the refugee.

These societies of

Jews from various European countries kept in close
contact with their homelands and maintained aid to
refugees from those areas.

Although there was no

comparable organization for German-American Jews,

the

German-American Jewish community revealed an intense

34

Tartakower and Grossmann,

The Jewish Refugees.

84.
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enough concern for their heritage to devote considerable
effort to refugee-aid activities.35
Yet,

for the Jewish refugee,

the United States

apparently provided the best possible hope in a situation
where little hope existed.

The records of the

naturalization agencies can act as a testament to the
fact that German-Jewish refugees believed that the United
States was to be their new homeland:

they were the

largest group of all immigrant groups to apply for United
States citizenship.36

35Tartakower and Grossmann,
"Simpson,

The Jewish Refugee.

The Refugee Problem,

467.

82.

Chapter 3
THE EMERGENCY VISA QUAGMIRE

It was understandable that refugees from Nazi
persecution looked to the United States for relief.

Yet,

it also was obvious that the expected relief and support
would not be forthcoming if the State Department decided
to follow its traditional immigration and refugee aid
policies.
It is not surprising,

therefore,

that by July 1940

committees supporting aid to refugees sprang up
throughout the United States.

The President's Advisory

Committee on Political Refugees

(PACPR),

acting as an

umbrella organization for all refugee aid societies,
assumed the responsibility of facilitating the issuance
of emergency visitors' visas,

immigration visas,

and

transit certificates to refugees who were imperiled in
Spain,

Portugal,

Southern France,

colonies of Morocco and Tunis.

and the French African

Under the agreement

reached on 26 July 1940 between officials of the PACPR,
the Justice Department,

and the State Department,

requests for special emergency visas went first to the

29

30
PACPR in New York City which confirmed each recommended
person's character and confirmed the purpose for coming
to the United States.

All approved applications were

sent to the Justice Department for clearance and to the
State Department to determine the possibilities that the
applicant might engage in activity "inimical to the
United States."

If the applicant were approved,

the State

Department notified the nearest consul to the applicant
and the visa was issued.1
Visitors' visas had to be issued because most of the
national quotas had been filled and visitors' visas could
be issued without reference to a quota.

While the

visitors' visa requirements were quite often beneficial
to those wishing to leave Germany and German occupied
territory,

problems existed that could prove to be

insurmountable.

In the sixteen years following the

passage of the 1924 Immigration Act,

the U.

S.

government

had required that a visitor to the United States must
have proof of the ability either to return to his or her
native land or to visit another country.
administration could
circumstances)

The Roosevelt

(and often did in extraordinary

waive those requirements as long as it

^ong Diary, 3 October 1940; David Wyman, Paper
Walls: American Refugee Policy and the Refugee Crisis.
1938-1941 (Amherst:
University of Massachusetts Press,
1968), 139; Brietmann and Kraut, American Refugee Policy
and European Jewry, 129.
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upheld the public charge,

physical,

mental,

moral,

and

other qualifications of the 1917 Act.2
The administration suspended the six month
limitation on visitors' visas,

but it made it clear that

refugees under the visitors' visas would have to leave
the United States as soon as possible.

Two months after

the State Department adopted that policy,

a worried Long

wrote to Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A.
the emergency visa program was

Berle that

"a departure from long-

established interpretation of the immigration law in
order that visitors' visas and transit certificates could
be issued to refugees desiring to come here and who will
probably remain in this country."3
In order to receive an emergency visa,

the applicant

had to include the usual affidavit of financial support
from a resident of the United States guaranteeing that
the visitor would not become a public charge.
affidavit" was also necessary,

A "moral

attesting to the good

character of the prospective visitor and describing the
applicant's past political activities.

An applicant also

had to give some evidence that he or she was in imminent

2

Wyman,

3

Paper Walls,

13 9,

Long to Adolf A Berle,
container 211, Long Papers.

14 0.

Jr.,

7 February 1941,
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danger and that temporary residence would pose no threat
to the United States.4
Problems emerged following the fall of France to
Germany.

In August 1940,

Eleanor Roosevelt received a

complaint from the Emergency Rescue Committee,

an

organization which coordinated refugee rescue efforts,
that the American consul in France,
instructions

(which,

incidentally,

operating under new
were in conflict with

the 2 6 July agreement reached by the PACPR,
Department,

and the Justice Department),

State

would not grant

visas to individuals recommended by the PACPR unless they
had a French exit visa.
government,

The problem was that the Vichy

under German pressure,

issuance of exit visas.

Mrs.

had suspended the

Roosevelt wrote to Under

Secretary of State Sumner Welles and his response was
that the United States did not want to give the
appearance of helping individuals break French law.
assured her,

however,

He

that non-French citizens would be

granted visas even if they were without exit permits.5

Not

only had Long and the State Department instructed consuls
to cease issuing visas to refugees without exit permits.

4

Wyman,

5

Paper Walls,

141.

Ibid., 142.
Long and his lieutenants at the State
Department disagreed.
See Long Diary 23 December 1940
and, especially, 28 January 1941, for his wish to follow
the laws.
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they also restricted the issuance of visas to prominent
writers and labor leaders,

thereby excluding the very

groups to which the emergency visa policy could best be
applied.6

Long did not deny this;

in fact,

Long

established a series of administrative devices which
curtailed drastically the flow of refugees into the
United States.7
Long's instructions to the consuls to limit the
issuance of visas
scientists)

(including visas to scholars and

nearly caused a mass resignation in the Fall

of 194 0 by the PACPR.8

When previously the Vichy

government requested that the United States allow Jewish
refugees from France to enter the United States,
rejected the request,

arguing that

Long

"the laws of the

United States regarding immigration are explicit and do
not permit any further liberalization

.

.

.

."9

Long

even abandoned his earlier efforts to rescue Jewish
rabbis and rabbinical students from the European Yeshivas

Washington Star. 20 December 1940,
container 202, Long Papers.
7

211,

See Long to Berle and Dunn,
Long Papers.
8

New York Evening Post,

9

clipping in

26 June 1940,

11 February 1941,

container

7.

Long to Ray Atherton, 10 December 1940, container
202, Long Papers.
Long also believed that this was just
an excuse for the Gestapo to plant agents among the
refugees who would be admitted under a "liberalization"
of the policy; see Long Diary, 28 January 1941.
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because he did not believe that there could be any
"definite assurance"

that those whose names were on the

consular lists would be the same individuals who received
visas.10
The case of the S.

S. Ouanza perhaps best

illustrates the belief by PACPR members that Long was the
major problem.

The S.

S. Ouanza had sailed from Portugal

in August 1940 with a large number of refugees on board.
The intent was to discharge the refugees somewhere in
either South or North America
to the owners of the ship).

(at a considerable profit
Finding that neither

Nicaragua nor Mexico would accept the passengers,
ship's captain sailed northward,
Norfolk,

the

preparing to refuel at

Virginia and then to return to Portugal.

Long

was of the opinion that the captain had "conveniently
discovered they would have to put into Norfolk for coal"
and complained about being "flooded with pressure groups
and telegrams and telephones and personal visits to
permit the landing of persons off the boat."
his diary,

however,

He noted in

that he "consistently declined to

deviate from the procedure which we adopted and said that
the fact that the people were on the boat and nearing the

10

Long to Warren, 2 June 1941, container 211, Long
Papers; Long to Travers, 16 December 1943, container 212,
Long Papers; see also copy of Rabbi S. Gourary to Sidney
Hillman, 23 June 1941, container 211, Long Papers; Long
to Warren, 7 February 1941, container 211, Long Papers.
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American shores did not constitute an emergency of anykind. "

He also speculated the only reason some

considered it to be an emergency was because "they were
all Jewish" and "they all had money."11
It was a complex and not too pretty situation.
Latin American countries had sold visas
$100 to $500 each)

(at anywhere from

with the stipulation that the refugee

could not go to the country which issued the visa.
his discussion with Roosevelt,
President

In

Long assumed that the

"would leave the matter entirely in my hands."

After consultation with the Justice Department and
recognizing the recommendations of the PACPR and the
Marshall Field Committee for the Saving of British
Children regarding the children aboard the S.

S.

Ouanza,

Long was willing to allow those persons with valid
documents to have transit across or through the United
States

"provided they complied with the requirements."

Long had initially opposed the Justice Department's legal
reasoning that the ship could dock and the passengers on
the ship could be screened as to whether or not they
qualified for visas.12

Henry Feingold argues that Long

saw this procedure as not only "an attempt to circumvent
the regulations" but also as a

11

Long Diary,

12

Ibid.

"direct challenge to his

18 September 1940.
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authority,

and refused to accept their

[sic]

legal

reasoning. "13
Long was furious when he learned that 4 0 of the 83
refugees qualified for visas.

He insisted that this was

far in excess of the number I anticipated and I
am sure now was a very generous interpretation
of the validity of the documents in question;
and that [Patrick Malin] had construed
everybody else on the boat to be a political
refugee and that they could come ashore.14
He believed that he had been tricked.

Nine days before,

he had entered in his diary that allowing the refugees to
land "would be a violation of the spirit of the law if
not the letter.

We have been generous--but there are

limitations.[italics added]"15
would be a

"violation of the Law" and that he "would not

be a party to it
it"

Now he argued that it

.

.

. would have no responsibility for

and that he might have to "take up the matter in some

other way . "16

13Feingold,

The Politics of Rescue.

14

Long Diary,
Container 5.
15

Long Diary,

16

18 September 1940,

143-144.

Long Papers,

9 September 1940.

Long Diary, 18 September 1940.
Two days before
Long had noted that only two adults and maybe their
children were legally entitled to enter the United
States.
See Memorandum of Conversation, Mr. Patrick
Malin and Mr. Long, 16 September 1940, container 211,
Long Papers.
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The other way he had in mind was to contact the
President.

It was urgent for Long to see the President as

soon as possible because by late September 1940 several
refugee rescue organizations had grown impatient with the
lack of progress in the emergency visa program.
PACPR,

The

distraught over what they now concluded was the

obstructionism of Long and the State Department,

was

already preparing to call for a meeting with the
President.17

Long was determined to

place in our Consuls abroad rather than the
President's Committee in New York the final
determination as to whether a person was
entitled to entry into the United States.18
He was one step away from control of the refugee problem,
he believed.

The "list of the Rabbis has been closed and

the list of the labor leaders has been closed," he wrote.
He then concluded that

"it remains for the President's

Committee to be curbed in its activities.
While James McDonald,

.

.

."19

chairman of the PACPR,

attempted to undermine Long's influence by working
through Eleanor Roosevelt,
Through his friend,

Long gained the upper hand.

Edwin M."Pa" Watson,

17

Roosevelt's

Long Diary, 3 October 1940; clipping from the
Washington Star. 20 December 1940, container 202, Long
Papers.
18

Long Diary,

19

Ibid.

18 September 1940.
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secretary.

Long and his representatives at the State

Department had relatively easy access to the White House
while McDonald,

Myron C.

Taylor,

Rabbi Stephen S. Wise,

and other refugee advocates were forced to depend on the
good offices of Mrs. Roosevelt to gain an audience with
the President.

Even at that,

the PACPR and other

refugees advocates soon discovered that when they finally
got to see the President,

either Long or one of his

associates at the State Department had "briefed"
President on the impending meeting.

the

Until 1944 the

President thus viewed refugee problems through the eyes
of Long and his associates at the State Department.20
The Assistant Secretary got his meeting with the
President and informed Roosevelt that 2,583 special visas
had already been authorized and urged that enough time
had passed for the submission of names of most of the
outstanding political and intellectual refugees,
for those in immediate danger.21

except

Long made it clear that

he wanted to cancel the department's mandatory
instructions

(from the 2 6 July agreement)

which he

believed gave the PACPR too much authority.

He wanted

20

Ibid.
See also Washington Star, 20 December 1940,
clipping in container 202, Long Papers.
See also
Feingold, Politics of Rescue. 145.
21

Ibid.
See New York Evening Post,
7 for Long's comments.

17 February 1941,
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the consuls to have "some latitude of judgment."22

Since

only 40 of the 567 refugees recommended by the PACPR and
approved by the State Department had received visas,

it

is obvious that some consuls were already exercising
"some latitude of judgment."

Indeed,

the numbers prove

that refugees were not granted visas from American
officials in Lisbon as often as suggested.23
not be surprising,

This should

given the fact of George Messersmith's

warning to Long of the "inflexibility and lack of
understanding" of Consul Young in Lisbon.
among other things,

Young had,

refused to issue replacement visas to

applicants whose visas had expired because they had not
been able to reach the American Embassy in Lisbon in
time.24
Long had included in an advisory letter to the
President a draft of a letter from Secretary of State
Cordell Hull to the PACPR which recommended a more
careful examination by the consuls in Europe of emergency
visas with an emphasis upon making the refugees present
evidence that their past political activities,
continued,

if

would not in any way endanger or embarrass the

22

Long to FDR, 18 September 1940, Container 211,
Papers; Long Diary, 18 September 1940.
23

Wyman,
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container 211,
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United States.

This became the official policy on 19

September 1940.25
This letter to the President,
modification of policy,

and the subsequent

caused an almost complete break

between the Visa Division of the State Department and the
PACPR.

Hull had become convinced of the correctness of

Long's position after Long had communicated to him that
his Visa Division chief,

Elliot Coulter,

had noted that

hundreds and perhaps thousands of names had been added to
the original list given by the PACPR,

the A.

F.

of L.,

and Rabbi Stephen S. Wise and other rabbis.26
As Chairman of the PACPR, McDonald was sincerely
devoted to the refugee effort and as such was outraged by
the virtual termination of the special program for
political refugees.

Unaware that Long had already

contacted the President,

McDonald and Warren wanted a

return to the 2 6 July agreement and hoped that the
President would intervene on the behalf of the PACPR.
They contacted Hull,

and Eleanor Roosevelt,

pleading

their case.

25

Long to FDR, 18 September 1940, including a draft
of a letter from Hull to James G. McDonald, container
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Long had little difficulty in convincing the
President that the consul on the scene should have the
final say.

Roosevelt had been contacted on several

occasions by Herbert Pell,

American Minister to Lisbon,

and Pell had prepared the way in the President's mind for
the "trump card"

that Long said he played in the meeting.

He informed the President that two World Jewish Congress
officials,

sponsored by Stephen S. Wise,

were good

examples of the problems that could occur.
officials,

he told the President,

The two

and later recorded in

his diary,
were a man and his wife who had represented the
Rabbi's organization but who professed to a
long series of political activities in Europe
and an intention to follow a course in the
United States irrespective of the desires of
the American Government but to take orders from
the World Jewish Congress.
They professed to
have been responsible for the overthrow of one
Rumanian government and to have been very
active in politics in Europe for years.27
Long also forwarded to the President a telegram he
received after their meeting.
Lawrence A.

Steinhardt,

The telegram was from

Ambassador in Moscow,

and it

warned that any relaxation of policies concerning visas
could be extremely dangerous.

Steinhardt informed Long

that the consular section in Moscow had suspended all
doubtful cases because of the "past and future

27

Long Diary,

3 October 1940,

container 5.
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activities" of the applicants,
"politically active"

many of whom had been

in such groups as the Zionist Labor

Party and "might well transplant their entire political
organization to the United States."
he had won his case,

Long believed that

writing that the President

"was 100%

in accord with my ideas," and that Roosevelt was

"in

entire accord with the policy which would exclude persons
about whom there was any suspicion that they would be
inimical to the welfare of the United States no matter
who vouchsafed for them and irrespective of their
financial or other standing."28
The fact that Long cited and agreed with Steinhardt,
and the fact that Roosevelt,
philosophy,
telling.

knowing both men's basic

did not challenge their recommendations is

Himself a Jew,

Steinhardt expressed to Long in

1941 a sentiment about Russian,

Polish,

and Eastern

European Jews that at first glance appears anti-Semitic.
He described those immigrants,

according to Long,

"as

entirely unfit to become citizens of this country."
believed them to be.

Long continued,

"lawless,

defiant--and in many ways unassibilable
were,

in Long's words,

28

[sic]."

He

scheming,
They

"the same as the criminal Jews who

Copy of telegram from Steinhardt to Long, 3 October
1940, container 211, Long Papers. Long Diary, 3 October
1940.
See Congressional Record, LXXXVII. Part 5, 77th
Congress, 1st Session, 4754-4755.
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crowd our police dockets in New York and with whom he is
acquainted and whom he feels are never to become
moderately decent American citizens."

Long was in total

agreement with Steinhardt's 1941 opinion,

writing

I think he is right--not as regards the Russian
and Polish Jew alone but the lower level of all
that Slav population of Eastern Europe and
Western Asia--the Caucasus, Georgia, Ukraine,
Croat, Slovene, Carpatho-Ukraine, Montenegro,
etc.
They ... in short have a philosophy
entirely foreign to our standards of government
and proper conduct in public and private
life.29
Steinhardt's ideas and activities,

unlike Long's,

changed

during the war years and he would later become an
advocate of a much less restrictive refugee policy.30
When the PACPR got its meeting with Roosevelt six
days after Long had met him,
already settled.

the issue was apparently

Accompanying George Warren,

executive secretary of the PACPR,
chairman,
General,

and McDonald,

at the meeting was Francis Biddle,
and Henry Hart,

Jr.,

the
its

Solicitor

Riddle's assistant.

Hart

noted that McDonald ended the thirty minute session
completely frustrated because every time he attempted to

29

Long Diary,

30

28 November 1941.

See Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews, 217 n., for
a discussion of Steinhardt's activities while he was an
ambassador to Turkey in 1944.
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plead his case Roosevelt would remember another anecdote
to tell.31
When Long,

Hull,

and Sumner Welles met with the

President on the following day,

Long recorded in his

diary that Roosevelt told the group that

"he hadn't had

time to listen to McDonald" and that when Mcdonald
complained about Long and the new State Department
policy,

he had told McDonald not to "'pull any of that

sob stuff'"because he

"knew enough about the situation to

know that the Consuls

.

.

.

had to have,

and he would

insist upon their having jurisdiction in these cases

.

.
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Long got what he wanted.

He became the official in

the State Department with the major responsibility for
determining which refugees would be admitted and which
would be denied admission to the United States.
Roosevelt's handling of the PACPR-State DepartmentJustice Department controversy was consistent with the
way he approached many problems within his
administration.
against the ends,

He was known for playing the middle
telling his speech writers for example

to work out the differences between them and never
understanding why that would be a problem.

31

Wyman,

32

Paper Walls,

Long Diary,

147

10 October 1940.

He simply

45
told the State Department,

the Justice Department,

and

the PACPR to work out their differences.33
McDonald,

who was not accustomed as were the members

of the Roosevelt administration to Roosevelt's manner of
handling controversy,

reported to Felix Frankfurter that

he believed that he had the support of the President.
When some members of the PACPR met for dinner five days
after their visit with the President,

they believed that

they could expect fairness but little initiative from
Sumner Welles but they expected little cooperation from
Long.34
Three days later,

on 18 October 1940,

Long,

Welles,

and Solicitor General Francis Biddle met and worked out
the policy that they would follow.
following:

They agreed on the

the PACPR should have primary responsibility

for securing the departure of sponsored refugees from
Europe; visas could be issued without an exit permit;
visas should not be based upon either numbers or quota
but solely upon the "meritorious" qualification of the
applicants and thus all visa application should be made
by individuals rather than groups;

and,

significantly,

consuls should have the final say in determining who

"ibid.
34

Breitmann and Kraut,
European Jewry, 133.
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received the visa.
however,

As a concession to the PACPR,

the three men agreed that should a consul reject

a PACPR-recommended applicant the consul would have to
cable his reasons to the State Department and follow that
with a mail dispatch containing the pertinent
information.35
The visa situation appeared to be dismal for
political refugees.

By mid-November the Emergency Rescue

Committee informed Eleanor Roosevelt that almost no new
visas had been granted under the month-old program.

The

consul in Lisbon was apparently one of the main villains
in this piece,

since there were reports that Washington

approved refugees had been either refused their visas or
were still waiting after two months for an approval by
the consul in Lisbon.35
Finally,
worked out.

in late November 1940,

a compromise was

The PACPR would still be permitted to submit

a list of approved names

(provided that the PACPR could

vouch for the applicant's background and they could show
that the sponsors could assure the ability of the refugee
to move to the United States and then to another

35

Long's Memorandum of a Conference at Luncheon,
May 1940, container 211, Long Papers.
36

18

See Messersmith to Long, 30 July 1940, container
211, Long Papers, for the previous problems with Lisbon.
See Wvman.Paper Walls, 147, for the complaints in
November.
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country).

The names then would be scrutinized by a

committee consisting of representatives of the State and
Justice Departments,

the FBI,

Military Intelligence,

the Office of Naval Intelligence,

and

and the committee would

then forward its recommendation to the State Department
and the Justice Department.

Only then would the State

and Justice Departments send their list of approved names
to the proper consuls in Europe.

Consuls still had the

right to refuse a visa to a person whose name appeared on
the approved list.

Accordingly,

after a consul refused a

visa of an already approved refugee,
begin all over.

In essence,

the process would

consuls still made the final

judgment as to the issuance of all visas.37
pleased with the outcome,

Long was

especially since he had fought

for the inclusion of an FBI agent on the screening
committee.38
Long's newly formed interdepartmental committee
managed to curtail the number of visas which were issued.
In the period between 5 August and 18 December 1940,

only

21 percent of the applicants for visa were successful.39

37Long Diary, 14 and 22 November 1940; see also
Department of State Bulletin, III (21 December 1940) :
565 .
38

Long Diary,

39

22 November 1940.

The actual number was 238 approved of 1137
submitted. Feingold, Politics of Rescue, 148.
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Although this restrictive approach did not please refugee
advocates in the Justice and Interior Departments,
several issues would emerge which would increase tensions
to the breaking point between the supporters of Long's
policy in the State Department and the advocates in other
departments in the Roosevelt administration of a more
lenient refugee and emergency visa policy.

The first

issue regarded the question of national security and its
relation to the refugee problem.

The second issue

related to the admission of refugee children to the
United States and could be dated back to Kristallnacht in
1938,

more than a year before Long was appointed

Assistant Secretary.

The third issue,

and the one which

would lead to the eventual establishment of the War
Refugee Board in 1944,

concerned the apparent inability

of Long and other members of the State Department to
recognize that Nazi Germany was intent upon achieving the
final solution to the Jewish problem in Europe.

Chapter 4
TO SECURE THE NATION

Long expressed a concern for saboteurs and possible
spies which revealed a state of mind that Saul S.
Friedman has labelled as one of
everywhere,"1

"seeing spies

Long worked against possible spies who

might infiltrate the United States under the cover of the
refugee rescue program.

He was convinced that members of

the PACPR were completely ignorant of the possibilities
of the danger that existed.

In one instance he submitted

to the FBI the name of an individual,
PACPR,

approved by the

whom he described in his diary as an "expert

dynamiter with a subversive intent."

He also

participated in the formation of legislation,

submitting

to Attorney General Francis Biddle a draft text on the
exclusion of aliens whose entry might prove
the interests of the United States."

'Friedman,

In addition,

No Haven For the Oppressed,

"Long Diary,

"inimical to
he

118.

20 November 1940.

Long to Hull,
Papers.

1 October 1940,
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container 5,

Long
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gave his support in late 1940 to the attempt to admit
some European intellectuals only after the Attorney
General and the Justice Department agreed to tighten
immigration procedures.4
The use of the issue of national security to curtail
admission of refugees into the United States can be seen
in the battle between Long and his supporters in the
State Department and Harold Ickes and his supporters in
the Interior Department.

Ickes and his supporters had

developed a plan to use the Virgin Islands as a refugee
way station until the refugees could be admitted into the
United States.

Long and his people opposed such a plan.5

Although the Interior Department had administrative
jurisdiction over the Virgin Islands,

all matters

connected to immigration also had to clear the
bureaucratic and legal tangles of the State Department.
The planned Interior Department
refugees would not be limited,

4

"visitors" policy for
however,

Memorandum of Long to Hull,
container 211, Long Papers.
5

by the quota

3 and 18 October 1940,

There also was an attempt to use Alaska as a
possible refugee haven; see a bill introduced by Samuel
Dickstein (Dem., N.Y.) into the House of Representatives
(House Journal, 2791, 29 January 1941; Congressional
Record, 88, Part 10, 77th Congress, 1st Session, A41907;
see also New York Times, 10 December 1940, 30; Long
Memorandum, 13 November 1940, Container 211, Long Papers;
and Warren to Hackenworth, 4 February 1941, container
211, Long Papers.
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system of the existing immigration laws;

the only-

limitation would be that consuls had the right to
determine the desirability of prospective "visitors."
Ickes and his staff attempted to circumvent this
bureaucratic roadblock by getting a policy adopted that
would permit a "visitor"

to the Virgin Islands without a

visa and would allow him to remain in the Virgin Islands
until his name appeared on the list for the permanent
quota entry to the United States.
approach,

if adopted,

Long saw this

as a major departure from the

current immigration policy and he was correct.6

And,

as

was often the case, when a departure from policy
conflicted with a humanitarian gesture.

Long upheld the

validity of the official policy.
Ickes and his advisors still had another trump to
play in their game.

An Executive Order in 1938,

in Executive Order 8430 in June 1940,

repeated

permitted the

Governor of the Virgin Islands to open the Islands to
individuals on an emergency basis without recourse to the
consuls and without the normal visa process.

Proceeding

on the belief that Long and the State Department would
acquiesce without seeking Congressional authorization,
Ickes and Governor Cramer of the Virgin Islands prepared

6

Long Diary, 13 November 1940; Long Memorandum,
November 1940, container 211, Long Papers.

13
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to move.

Cramer prepared a proclamation that would have

permitted a select group of refugees to enter the Virgin
Islands without visas.
proposal.

First,

Long would not support the Cramer

he was opposed because he saw the Ickes

proposal as completely ignorant of the possibility of
infiltration by Nazi spies.
thousand"

"Amongst the twelve

refugees in Portugal who would qualify to enter

under the Ickes plan.
German agents."
"constituted",

Long wrote in his diary,

"are many

He continued that the proclamation
furthermore,

"a pipe line to siphon

refugees out of Portugal into the United States without
the precautionary steps of investigation and
checking...."

Long also believed that this was part of a

collusion between the Interior Department,
other refugee advocates.

the PACPR,

and

The newspaper clippings of

comments made by Secretary Ickes that Long kept in his
files suggest that he believed that Ickes was not only
unaware of the threat of subversion but was a possible
threat himself to the security of the United States.7

7Long Diary, 13 November 1940.
Long kept a
newspaper clipping in which Ickes was quoted as saying
that he did not see how subversives could get from the
Virgin Islands to the mainland "unless they're longdistanced swimmers." Ickes was further quoted in the same
clipping as saying "I'd be willing to run the risk of a
few German agents getting here if a few more lives could
be saved."
See clipping of New York Evening Post, 18
December 1940, container 202, Long Papers.
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Long prevailed.

The State Department issued a memo

explaining why the Ickes proposal was not acceptable;
President Roosevelt,

and

buttressed by the State Department

memo and a ruling by Attorney General Robert Jackson to
the effect that the State Department's position was
correct,

and convinced that the Ickes plan might endanger

the country,

suspended Governor Cramer's proclamation.8

Not satisfied,

Long then attempted to block the use of

the Virgin Islands as a refugee station of last resort.
He contacted Admiral Alan J.
Intelligence,
Virgin Islands
reasons"

Kirk,

Chief of Naval

and proposed that the Navy proclaim the
"a restricted area for strictly naval

and therefore "prevent the raising of the

political questions involved in this refugee and
undesirable citizens traffic which is going on...."
"Then," he concluded in his diary,

"we would have no more

trouble."9
The scheme to use the Virgin Islands as a refugee
haven failed because the legal foundation on which it was

8

"Proposed Proclamation by the Governor of the
Virgin Islands," under cover letter "Opinion of Legal
Advisor, Department of State, 16 December 1940, container
211, Long Papers; Long Diary, 13 November 1940.
See also
a memo by Long included in a copy of a letter by Hull to
Roosevelt, 25 February 1941, ibid., for Long's fear,
based on information that he had received from the consul
in Lisbon, that several of the refugees who wished to get
in under the PACPR-Ickes plan were known Trotskyites.
9

Long Diary,

22 April 1941.
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based was not secure.

The fact remains,

the Governor of the Virgin Islands could,
executive order,

however,

that

through an

admit aliens without visas if an

emergency situation existed.

The State Department itself

had permitted by the end of 1940 political refugees to be
admitted as

"temporary visitors"

even though it was

evident that they could not return to their homeland.
Long's opposition to the use of the Virgin Islands
as a refugee way station,

and his success in doing so,

therefore became critical to the development of a refugee
policy by the United States in the early war years.

It

appears that his national security argument in the case
of the Virgin Islands provided a foundation for
subsequent arguments against a liberalization of the
immigration and visa programs as they pertained to
refugees from Nazi aggression.

If the national security

argument could work in the case of the Virgin Islands,
which was more than a thousand miles from the U.
mainland,

S.

it could obviously work for the continental

United States.10
10Long was selective in cases of national security.
If a refugee were a Trotskyite or a Zionist, Long opposed
him.
Yet he did not treat others in the same way.
See,
for example, an instance of an anti-Semitic Frenchman,
Pierre Massin, who, while boasting of his anti-Semitic
and pro-Fascist activities in France before the war, was
permitted to enter the United States at a time when Long
was fighting the admission of refugees to the Virgin
Islands and the admission of refugee children who were
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In early 1941,

Long renewed his efforts to clamp

down on the trickle of refugees who entered this
country.11

His efforts were in response to claims that

authorities in Germany,

Russia,

and Poland were coercing

refugees to engage in espionage activity on threat of
harm to their families if they did not cooperate.

Long

believed that enough such cases had been discovered to
warrant a more stringent policy.12
Almost as if in support of Long's argument,

in late

1941 the House Committee on Un-American Activities heard
the testimony of Richard Krebs.
Comintern agent,

Krebs was a reformed

a veteran of Nazi prisons,

and author

under the pen name of Jean Valtin of Out of the Night.
He explained,
operations,
States.

based on his knowledge of Gestapo

the Nazi methods of espionage in the United

During the hearing Krebs claimed that agents

disguised as political refugees formed a large group of

waiting rescue in Portugal.
Massin was quoted as saying
that he "would devote the rest of his life to destroying
the Jews" by the New York Evening Post.
Mr. Massin, it
seems, could come because he had met all the bureaucratic
qualifications; he had a proper exit permit from the
Germans in France and he indicated that he would return
to France. New York Evening Post. 15 December 1940,
clipping in container 202, Long Papers.
11

Long to Welles,
Papers.
12

17 March 1941,

container 211,

Long

Memorandum of Conversation with Clarence Pickett,
18 May 1941, container 212, Long Papers; Long to Pickett,
28 May 1941, ibid.
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the people chosen by the Nazis to spy for them.

He

further explained that many spies were actually former
political prisoners of Germany and that the Nazis held
their families as hostages in order to force them into
espionage activity.

In order to prevent any harm

befalling a relative held hostage,

these agents had to

forward monthly reports to the Gestapo.

Krebs asserted

that such refugees were easily accepted in democratic
nations because of their staunch past opposition to
Nazism,

but he insisted that he knew of no case where a

prisoner was released by the Nazis unless he signed a
pledge to serve the Gestapo.13
Kreb's testimony only strengthened Long's desire to
channel all visa applications through Washington.14

By

July 1941 his efforts were rewarded and became the
official policy of the United States.

Reacting to

Ambassador Steinhardt's reports of attempted infiltration
of the country by foreign agents,

Long in early May had

gone before a House Subcommittee on Appropriations to
plead his case.

The new program he proposed called for

13,1

Investigation of Un-American Propaganda Activities
in the United States," New York Times, 27 May 1941, 11.
See also, Hearings Before a Special Committee on UnAmerican Activities, House of Representatives, 77th
Congress, 1st Session, 26 May, 1941, XIV, 8481, 84888490 .
14

1941,

Long Diary, 25 April 1941; Long to Welles,
container 211, Long Papers.

17 March
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an expanded Visa Division,

with a staff of 300 persons,

to carry out the initial processing of immigration
applications based upon information received from each
alien's sponsor in the United States concerning the
applicant's character,

purposes for emigrating,

toward the United States,
assurance of support.

attitude

and the validity of his

The sponsors,

too,

would be

investigated to determine whether or not they were good
citizens or perhaps
the Government."

"engaged in activities inimical to

Another significant addition to the new

arrangement was the establishment of five
interdepartmental review boards to pass on the merits of
each visa application in Washington,

thus taking much of

the decision making away from the consuls in Europe.
consuls,

however, while relying upon the new system for

information,
matters.

The

would continue to have the final say in visa

The interdepartmental committees were to

include representatives from the visa division,
the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
Naval Intelligence,

the FBI,

the Office of

and the Military Intelligence

Division of the War Department.15
15Long Diary, 17 June 1941; Steinhardt to Long, 8 May
1941, container 203, Long Papers; "Additional Urgent
Deficiency Appropriation Bill, Fiscal Year 1941,"
Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on
Appropriations. House of Representatives 77th Congress,
1st Session, 1 May 1941, II, 137-146; Graham H. Stuart,
"Wartime Visa
Control Procedure," Department of State
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The compromise which had been reached in November
1940 to screen political refugees under the emergency
visa program paved the way for the new procedures
designed to apply to all immigration.16

Long maintained

the notion that a time-consuming process would discourage
"the insidious infiltration of whispering agents...the
agents of trouble and discord... the saboteurs

[who]

throw

monkey wrenches into the machinery...; with the object of
creating discord and dismay and of rendering nugatory
efficient organization."17
Even before Long's system had the force of law
behind it,

the Department had ceased issuing visas to a

large category of refugees.18

In early June,

consular

and diplomatic officials received instructions to
withhold visas from applicants who had parents,

children,

brothers or sisters residing in territory held by the
Germans,

Bulletin,

Italians,

11

or Russians.19

(10 September 1944):

The State Department

273.

16

Breckinridge Long, "Memorandum of a Conference at
Luncheon," 18 October 1940, container 211, Long Papers;
Department of State Bulletin 3(21 December 1940): 565.
"Department of State Bulletin,

4(28 June 1941):

761-

764 .
18

See a report from Long to Hull, 6 January 1941,
under cover letter "Hull to Roosevelt, 6 January 1941,"
container 211, Long Papers.
19

Department of State Bulletin.

4(21 June 1941):

748.
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did not go public with the new policy until the report
was accidentally leaked to the press.
officials,

State Department

reported the New York Times.

believed the

policy absolutely necessary because of extensive evidence
that Germany coerced refugees into becoming spies by
threatening to harm their families if they did not
cooperate.

Officials cited a case of a refugee living in

Cuba who had left his family in Germany and was reported
to have contact daily with the German embassy in
Havana.20

Long revealed in his diary,

however,

that he

was not satisfied with restricting the law to those with
relatives:
It just happens that yesterday morning I
discussed with [Avra] Warren the question of
excluding all persons whether they had
relatives in Germany or not and deny visas to
any immigrant in Germany, Russia, Italy or any
of their occupied territories....
I had come
to the point where I think it should be done,
and I am going to recommend it.21
The background and effects of the State Department
instruction of 5 June 1941 were outlined by the
Department and presented to the President in a
memorandum.
Long informed the President that the Department had
issued the instruction because of a confidential

20

Long Diary, 17 June 1941, container 5,
New York Times, 18 January 1941, 1.
2:i

Long Diary,

17 June 1941.

Long Papers;
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memorandum received by J.

Edgar Hoover.

Long learned

from Hoover that refugees leaving Vichy France were
required to submit an extra photograph which was
forwarded to the Second Bureau,
French espionage activity.

which was the agency for

Long assumed that many of

these refugees were forced to agree to spy for the French
and Germans.

This assumption was soon treated as

concrete evidence and was used as a reason for
restricting the flow of immigration.

Indeed,

it is

hardly a coincidence that the Bloom-Van Nuys bill,
introduced by a close friend of Long,
reflected Long's philosophy.

Sol Bloom,

The bill,

which included

the provision for five separate levels of review for
every immigration application,

became law on 20 June

1941.22
In his memorandum to the President,

Long justified

his position by stating that applications would be
restricted only after "meticulous inquiry"
background of the refugees,

and refugees'

would be declared undesirable if

into the
applications

"they had agreed to be

agents for one of these governments or who might under
circumstances existing and because of their mental

"Memorandum, Long to Roosevelt, 20 August 1941,
under cover letter Long to Edwin M. Watson 2 0 August
1941, container 202, Long Papers; Long Diary, 16 August
1941.
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philosophy serve as agents."
defined,

The last phrase was never

but consular officials generally interpreted it

to mean that there should be a general slowing down of
the inunigration visa policy.23
Long and his supporters in the State Department were
delighted with their success at pushing through the
"relative rule"
known).

(as the Bloom-Van Nuys bill came to be

Three years later,

Robert Alexander and Long,

reviewing the options they had in 1941,
their policy,
policy,

in

concluded that

which they defined as a middle-of-the-road

allowed the immigration door to remain ajar but

kept out people potentially dangerous to the nation.
They believed that Hull had also agreed and cited a
favorable report to Hull from the Attorney General on 27
November 1942 as

proof of the correctness of their

approach.24
The State Department also considered the policy a
holding action until Congress could act to bar
"subversive elements"

from the United States.

significantly long holding period,

however,

It was a

because Long

and the Visa Division operated for more than a year to
restrict dangerous aliens even though there was no legal

"Ibid.
24

Alexander to Long,
Long Papers.

2 February 1944,

container 202,
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basis in the immigration laws of that time for the action
that they were taking.

Long was aware of the shaky legal

claim upon which he and the State Department based the
new policy and worked steadily to get Congress to provide
explicit legislative authority for his policy.25

During

this same time Long got at least part of what he wanted.
Congress passed laws which gave unequivocal legal
foundation to his June 5th instruction to the consulates
and to all diplomatic officials and to his new system,
which was to go into effect on July 1st.

One law gave

consuls the right to deny visas to anyone they believed
might

"endanger the public safety of the United

States."26
case,

Although the State Department could review a

the consuls had the final say.

The effect of the

passage of this law was to return the State Department to
almost complete jurisdiction over the issuance of visas.
This in effect ended the dependence of the State
Department on the PACPR and the screening committee
authorized by the President.

25

See Long to Berle and James C. Dunn, 26 June 1940,
container 211, Long Papers; Long Diary, 25 April 1941;
and "Authorizing the Refusal of Visas to Undesirable
Aliens," Senate Report, 77th Congress, 1st Session, No.
386 (5 June 1941); Congressional Report. LXXXVII. Part 5,
77th Congress, 1st Session, 4757, 5048, 5133, 5386.
26

Ibid.
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Long had been anxious for some time to remove the
PACPR from any real business of advising in relation to
the issuance of

visas.

When he failed to include the

PACPR in requests for funds for 1941,

Long claimed that

his failure was an oversight and unintentional.
the PACPR believed him,

Few in

and only James McDonald's

recognition that the PACPR was in danger of having no
funds for 1941 and his subsequent appeal to the First
Lady saved the PACPR from near extinction.

Long,

who had

been known to use appropriation oversight in the past to
undermine an agency he did not approve,
the oversight and corrected his

apologized for

"error."27

Long was undoubtedly pleased because he interpreted
the legislation as providing that no alien would be
permitted to enter the United States

"if it appears to

the satisfaction of the Secretary of State that such
entry would be prejudicial to the interests of the United
States."

[italics added]28

It meant that his hand would

be strengthened considerably.
the visa system in Washington,

Long's desire to centralize
a proposal he had

suggested to the House Subcommittee on Appropriations in

27

Long to McDonald, 5 May 1941, container 188, Long
Papers; also Henry Feingold, The Politics of Rescue. 160.
28

Congressional Record, LXXXVI, Part 5, 77th
Congress, 1st Session,, 5053, 5325-5326, 5385-5389;
Department of State Bulletin 5(15 November 1941):
381382 .
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May,

was now fact and all visa applications,

even those

already through most of the approval process,
voided.

were now

All applicants now had to refile with new forms

provided by the Visa Division in Washington.

Sponsors

now had to affirm by signing an oath that the applicants
were of good moral and political character;

only then

would the application be placed under review by the State
Department and other agencies of the Government.29
Long also wanted to eliminate international
intervention in the visa granting process.

He achieved

this partially by constantly opposing the
Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees

(IGC).

The

result of these restrictive policies was not severe,
because nearly 85 percent of the visa applications were
approved.

But Long believed that he had accomplished his

task of defending the national security from possible
subversion,

writing to Roosevelt that in the previous

year fully 50 percent of those who were rejected were
refugees who had relatives in the countries he suspected
of providing possible espionage agents.30

29Department of State Bulletin,
764-765.
30

4(28 June 1941):

Long to Roosevelt, 20 August 1941, container 213,
Long Papers.
See also Memorandum of Conversation, 7
October 1942, B. Long and Minister of Switzerland,
container 203, ibid.
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Several important people spoke out against the Long
and Visa Division administered policy,
Einstein,

including Albert

who wrote to Eleanor Roosevelt that the new

procedure was making "immigration impossible by creating
a wall of bureaucratic measures alleged to be necessary
to protect American against subversive,
elements."31

dangerous

The pleas were to no avail.

Meanwhile,

tension increased between the advocates

of Long's policy in the State Department and the newly
appointed Attorney General and his supporters in the
Justice Department.

Biddle was inclined to be more

lenient in the administration of the restrictive refugee
policies.

Long viewed Biddle's appointment with concern,

writing in his diary before Biddle's appointment was
confirmed that the State Department and the Justice
Department would have some problems.
confided to his diary,

"I have," he

"nothing but difficulty with

Biddle and his subordinates."32

Seventeen months later

Long was still upset and bitterly complained in his diary
that

"Biddle and his subordinates" had "radical and

31

As quoted in Friedman, No Haven, 124.
For a
discussion of the protest launched against the policy,
see also:
the New York Times, 14 July 1941, p. 4; Jewish
Comment, 23(24 December 1943): 4; and Freda Kirschwey, "A
Scandal in the State Department," The Nation 153(19 July
1944): 45.
32

Long Diary,

17 June 1941.
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peculiar ideas...some of them inadmissible and
unacceptable. "33
The conflict between Biddle and Long surfaced almost
immediately.

Biddle informed Long and the State

Department that the Justice Department would make the
final decision in appeals cases when the Appeals Board
could not reach a decision.
friendly cooperation,"

Long,

"in the spirit of

informed the Attorney General that

he could not agree with his interpretation of the appeals
process .34
Meanwhile the new procedure was under attack by the
liberal press,
Republic.

especially The Nation and

The New

with the latter periodical aiming its

criticisms directly at Long.

Long felt a need to defend

himself and what he increasingly identified as his
policy.35
Long's six page memorandum to the President,
with the assistance of Avra Warren,

33

Long Diary,

34

while acknowledging

27 November 1942 .

Long to Biddle,
Papers.
35

drafted

3 July 1941,

container 211,

Long

For criticisms by the "liberal press," see The
Nation, 153(19 July 1941): 45; New York Evening Post, 18
December 1940; and The New Republic, 104(28 July 1941):
105-106.
For Long's reaction to what he referred to as
the "radical elements and organizations interested in
getting persons into the United States from doubtful
territory," [italics added], see Long Diary, 16 August
1941.
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as a "natural and wholesome development the PACPR
opposition to the

'close relatives' policy," played the

theme of espionage with a heavy hand.
claimed that

The memorandum

"foreign agents posing as refugees" had

either been discovered in the United States or had been
"apprehended after they left Europe but before they
reached the United States."

Although Long's memorandum

suggested that Roosevelt should meet with the PACPR to
clarify the issue,

he left no room for chance to

interfere with his application of visa policy.

He

opportuned "Pa" Watson to arrange a meeting with the
President before Roosevelt's meeting with McDonald of the
PACPR.

Long left the meeting with the President

convinced that Roosevelt was

"thoroughly in accord with

our policies and practices."36
When Long,

Attorney General Biddle, McDonald and

other PACPR representatives met with Roosevelt a week
later,

the PACPR group emphasized that they too were

concerned about national security but believed the four
changes that they were recommending in the visa policy
would not compromise the security of the nation.
four changes they recommended were:

36

1)

The

serious

Long to Roosevelt, 2 0 August 1941, under cover
letter. Long to Edwin M. Watson, 20 August 1941,
container 202, Long Papers; see also Long Diary, 27
August 1941.
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modification of the "relative rule";

2)

the inclusion of

only the State Department and Justice Department on the
interdepartmental committees on refugee matters;

3)

the

immediate creation of a board of appeals to hear cases
unfavorably reported by the interdepartmental committee;
and 4)

the right of refugee sponsors to appear before the

board of appeals as interested parties.
PACPR argued that,

McDonald and the

under the existing policy,

not even

one half of the regular German quota of applicants were
being accepted each month and that this was,

in effect,

an example of the State Department's barring refugees by
administrative fiat.

Roosevelt appeared to concur with

the modifications suggested by Attorney General Biddle
and the PACPR.
Long was not pleased.
for Biddle,

McDonald,

He did not hide his contempt

Rabbi Wise,

and the PACPR

supporters when on the same day he recorded his reactions
in his diary.

Indeed,

he did not do much to hide his

feelings in the meeting.

He wrote "I got a little mad

and I fear that I betrayed it...."

Wise,

he wrote in his

diary,
always assumes such a sanctimonious air and
pleads for the "intellectuals and brave
spirits, refugees from the torture of
dictators" or words to that effect.
Long could not accept the Rabbi's argument.
that

He believed
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only an infinitesimal fraction of the
immigrants are of that category--and some are
certainly German agents and others are
sympathizers, the last named
coming here
because it is away from the scene of combat and
looks like a safe place.
Biddle,

Long added,

was their "advocate" and he and

"these eminent gentlemen"
completely objectionable.

saw "my system of selection" as
They were after him.

Long was

convinced.
They would throw me to the wolves in their
eagerness to destroy me--and will try in the
future as they have in the past to ruin my
political status.37
Long's open opposition had its effect.
cancel the

Roosevelt did not

"close relative" policy and he only modified

the appeals process.

What was more important,

finding Long unyielding about his

Biddle,

"system of selection,"

offered a compromise in November that saved face for
Biddle and kept the "system"

intact for Long.

President would appoint two outsiders

(i.e.,

The
outside the

Justice and State Departments)

to be added to the review

board.

however,

The Secretary of State,

coula in

exceptional cases reverse the decisions of the review
board.

"Thanksgiving Day," Long wrote,

"came at an

appropriate time as far as I am concerned."38

The

37

Long Diary,

4 September 1941.

38

Long Diary,

5 November and 27 November 1941.

70
courses may have been rearranged,

but the meal was the

same.
The new system went into effect on 1 December 1941
and included Review Committees and a Board of Appeals.
Officials on the Review Committees were from the same
five agencies which were represented on the original
interdepartmental committees.

The interdepartmental

committees were now titled Primary Committees.

Two

individuals appointed by the President sat on the Board
of Appeals.
Under this new visa application process,
applications first went to the Primary Committee and if
approved went to the State Department and if approved at
that level then proceeded to the consul.
were rejected at any point in the process,

If an applicant
or if an

individual on the Primary Committee requested a review of
an approved application,
Review Committee.

the case was then sent to the

At that point the applicant could have

either or both his legal representative and his sponsor
plead his case.

If rejected either by the Review

Committee or by the State Department,

the applicant still

had the right of an appeal to the Board of Appeals which
reviewed the written records but held no hearing.

Should

either the Board of Appeals be divided or the State
Department opposed,

the application for visa would be
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denied.

Only the decision was announced;

rejection were not given.
persist,

the reasons for

If an applicant decided to

a reconsideration by the Board could be made

after a six months delay.

Even at that point,

a

successful applicant could be rejected by the consul and
the whole process would be repeated.

No wonder that

refugee advocates referred to this as the "endless
appeals system."

While the Board of Appeals tended to be

more sympathetic to the plight of refugees than the
Review Board,

the fact remains that 75 percent of the

appeals were rejected by the Board.39
Only 3000 quota visas were issued between 1 July and
1 December 1941,
Warren.

according to Visa Division Chief,

Of those,

Avra

a large portion actually received

their visas before the system was centralized in
Washington,

D.C..

A shortage of shipping plus the fact

"Department of State Bulletin, 5(20 December 1941):
566; BWF to Long, 3 June 1941, container 212, Long
Papers.
For an interesting survey of the visa
application process, see Graham H. Stuart, "Wartime VisaControl Procedure," Department of State Bulletin 11(10
September 1944):
276.
See also Wyman, Paper Walls, 202,
for a sample description of the questions asked sponsors
by the Review Committees.
For example:
Are you Jewish
by race and faith?
Do you belong to any political
organization or group in this country?
Have you read
Tolstoy?
Are you still a pacifist?
On this last point.
Long appeared to have a special interest himself, having
earlier advocated that 92 German-Jewish pacifists, then
in Britain, be denied admittance to the United States in
1940 because "if this country is not worth fighting for,
it is not worth coming to."
Long to Coulter, 30 August
1940, container 211, Long Papers.

that a visa expired four months after being issued
explains the delay in their arrival to the United
States.40

By late August 1941 transportation was no

longer the problem,

thanks to a decline in visa issuance

the last half of the year.41
Another lethal regulation had been added in July
1941 to the visa application procedure.
now had to have a form,
copies,

The applicant

four feet in length and in six

filled out by his or her sponsor and forwarded

not to the consul but to the Visa Division in Washington
Sponsors now had to prove their reputability by giving
details about their activities of the past decade,

proof

that the applicant for the visa would not engage in any
action dangerous to the United States,

and character

references from two or more American citizens whose
reputability could be easily verified.42
matters,

To complicate

Long specified in order 946 that a particular

type of typewriter had to be used;

one,

oddly enough,

that few consulates in Europe possessed.

The AJJDC

40

"Department of State Appropriations Bill for 1941,
Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on
Appropriations, 77th Congress, 2nd Session (21 January
1942), 11, 94.
41

New York Times,

42

Wyman,

3 September 1941,

18.

The Abandonment of the Jews,

127 .
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quickly sent the specified typewriters to the consulates
in Europe.43
More obstacles were added in the fall of 1941.
Applicants were now rejected because they could not prove
that they were in "acute danger."

Refugees who escaped

Nazi occupied territory and made it to Portugal would not
be considered in "acute danger" and would therefore be
denied a visa.

Refugees who were unable to flee the

Nazis,

were considered to be in acute danger but

however,

would not be able to receive a visa because there were no
American consulates in many parts of Nazi occupied
Europe.44
The State Department continued to believe that the
"national security"

issue was a viable one even though

most who have studied the situation believe that the
"problem as it related to refugees was greatly
exaggerated.

1,45

Long,

in particular,

continued to

believe that refugees were forced to serve as spies
because they had relatives who were being held hostage by
the Nazis.

His belief was contrary to that of the State

Department's own Review Board, which argued that an antiNazi refugee forced to serve as a spy could turn valuable

"Friedman,
44

No Haven,

123.

Conqressional Record,

4S

Wyman,

90,

666.

Abandonment of the Jews,

130.
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information over to the Americans and seriously sabotage
the Nazi spy effort.

The Board considered this such a

possibility that it was convinced that the Nazis would
never use refugees as spies.46
The new arrangement by Long might not have become
policy had not German-American relations deteriorated
between September 1940 and May 1941.

By July 1941 the

situation had become so tense that the German government
closed all American consulates,

thus making it impossible

for those who even had valid visas to escape Nazi Germany
and Nazi occupied Europe.
Spain,

Refugees in Vichy France,

and Portugal also faced the fact that those

governments had restricted severely the issuance of exit
permits.

In August 1941 the German government ceased

issuing exit permits and in October made it clear that no
Jews would be allowed to leave either the Reich or the
Government General of Poland.47
If Long had not felt the pressure before,

he

certainly did following the events of the summer and fall
of 1941.
[sic]

He wrote in his diary that

"everyone wants their

friends out now." He nevertheless adhered to his

belief that a true security threat still existed,
that

adding

"Pressure is very bad and Germany sees her last

46

Ibid. ,

47

131.

Tartakower and Grossmann,

The Jewish Refugee,

473.
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chance to get her agents out and our inspection is very
austere."48

Long,

bureaucrat,

followed the letter of the law.

ever the legalist and efficient

group," he wrote to Sumner Welles,

"No single

"can be segregated

from another group and made an exception without
extending the exception to each member of each other
group."49
rules.

One rule simply bred amplifications for other

For example,

to Cuba,

George Messersmith,

the Ambassador

now informed the Cuban government that eighty

percent of the European born immigrants who had been
admitted to Cuba would be denied American visas.
Messersmith then advised the Cuban officials that Cuban
immigration policy would need to be changed to adjust to
this new approach.50
Six months later,

the United States was at war.

Where before national security had been the rationale for
a strict immigration and visa policy,

after 1941 and

until the end of the war the new rationale used by the
government was that wartime exigency did not permit
either the relaxation of policy or the expenditures of
more monies and energy.

48

25 June 1941.

49

Long to Welles,

Long Diary,

211,

Long's argument against a too

Memorandum,
Long Papers.
50

Brietmann and Kraut,
European Jewry, 137.

1 July 1941,

container

American Refugee Policy and
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liberal refugee policy now took a new twist:

by 1943 he

would write in his diary that too liberal a policy
concerning Jewish refugees could serve to promote a
"reaction against their

[Jews']

interest" and might

persuade the public that Hitler's charges were true that
the United States had gone to war "at the instigation and
direction of our Jewish citizens."51

51Long Diary,

20 April 1943

Chapter 5
SAVING THE CHILDREN

Long's interdepartmental committee managed to
restrict the number of visas which were issued.
period between 5 August and 18 December 1940,

In the

only 21

percent of the applicants for visas were successful.1
This restrictive approach did not please refugee
advocates in either the Justice or the Interior
Departments and an issue emerged which soon increased
tensions between the supporters of Long in the State
Department and the advocates of a lenient refugee and
emergency visa policy.
The issue concerned the admission of refugee
children to the United States and could be dated back to
Kristallnacht in 1938,

more than a year before Long was

appointed Assistant Secretary.

Roosevelt had responded

publicly two weeks after Kristallnacht by announcing that
he was ordering his ambassador to Germany to return to

1

The actual number was 238 approved of 1137
submitted.
Feingold, The Politics of Rescue, 148.
77
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Washington for a "report and consultation."2
however,

He did not,

break off diplomatic relations with Germany and

it does not appear as if that course were ever seriously
considered by the State Department.

Roosevelt's major

response at that time was to mollify the
restrictionistsin Congress by stating that while the
State Department was willing to extend visitors' permits
by six months,

such an action should not be construed as

a modification of the quota system.3
No Haven for the Oppressed,
Beyond Belief,
Roosevelt,

Saul Friedman,

and Deborah E.

Lipstadt,

in
in

both argue that it was at this point that

beset by restrictionists in Congress and at

his lowest in popular approval,

failed to assume a

potential leadership role in the refugee problem.
Dallek,

in his study of Roosevelt's foreign policy,

agrees,

writing that the

Robert

"Jewish dilemma did not command

a very high priority in his mind."4

This failed

2

Samuel Rosenman. ed.. Public Papers and Addresses
of Franklin D. Roosevelt 7 (New York:
Macmillan, 1941):
597.
See also New York Times. 15 November 1938, 1; and
see, for the draft prepared by the State Department,
Cordell Hull, Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York:
Macmillan, 1948), 24-25, 599.
3

Rosenman, Public Papers of FDR, 7:
598.
See also
Samuel Dickstein, "Refugees and Economics," Nation 147(10
December 1938), 609-611; and Freda Kirchwey, "Jews and
Refugees," Nation 148(20 May 1939): 577-578.
4

Friedman, No Haven, 90-91; Lipstadt, Beyond Belief.
108; and Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and
American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (New York: Oxford
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opportunity,

whether deliberate or not,

was unfortunate

because an argument could be made that Roosevelt's
assumption of a more direct role in the relief and rescue
programs for refugees,
particular,

and refugee children in

would have damaged neither his strained

relationship with Congress nor his popularity with the
American public.
Children were often exempt from anti-refugee
sentiment and Roosevelt,

never one to miss an opportunity

to enhance his public image,

could have acted and gained

public support with a policy directed toward the rescue
of innocent children.

There were certainly enough

stories to be exploited:

stories of women pleading with

officials to take their children even though it could
mean never seeing them again,
separated,

stories of families

and stories of children who could not locate

their parents or any other relatives.5
Long presented another point of view about refugee
children.

He believed the sympathy expressed for the

children had taken on the proportions of

"an enormous

psychosis" which could be attributed to "a repressed

University Press,
5

1979),

168.

Davie, The Refugees Are Now Americans. 17-18;
Simpson, Refugees. 27; "Admission of German Refugee
Children," Hearings Before the Committee on Immigration
and Naturalization, House of Representatives. 76th
Congress, 1st Session,
(20-22, 24 April 1939), 16, 73.
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emotion about this war."

Long admitted that the matter

had to be handled "very delicately and carefully,"
because many individuals

"who ordinarily are hard-headed,

common-sensed individuals" had become either "emotional"
or "temporarily emotional"

in the matter of refugee

children.6
Long's assessment was mistaken.
individuals,

Many prominent

certainly not overly emotional in their

public dealings,

supported the idea of making a special

case for refugee children.

They listened to and agreed

with the ideas of Clarence Pickett,

head of the United

States Committee for the Care of European Children.

So

encouraging was the support for a special effort that
rescue advocates believed that Congress should be willing
to open the door to refugee children regardless of the
quota system.
On 9 February 1939,
N.

Y.)

Mass.)

Senator Robert Wagner

and Representative Edith Nourse Rogers

(Dem.,
(Rep.,

introduced a resolution that called for the

admission over a two year period of 20,000 German
children under the age of 14.7

6

Long Diary,

7

Although this was

12 July 1940.

See Committee on Immigration and Naturalization,
House of Representatives, Hearings of the Joint
Resolution To Authorize the Admission of a Limited Number
of Refugee Children, 76th Congress, 1st Session (24-25,
and 31 May and 1 June 1939; Wagner-Rogers Resolution).
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encouraging to the rescue advocates,

the Wagner-Rogers

Resolution failed to emerge from the House Committee on
Immigration and Naturalization.

Rescue advocates were

discouraged but not deterred. And they were encouraged by
the fact that public opinion polls revealed that 58
percent of the Americans who were asked stated that they
would agree with a policy that would permit the admission
of French and British children to the United States until
the war ended,

and 2 5 percent of those who responded

positively said they would be willing to house the
children themselves.8
Long,

ever the legalist,

of public sentiment.

was disturbed by this type

He wrote that the Secretary of

State had asked him to handle the evacuation of British
children,

but he believed that

limited."

"under our laws we are

"The British," he continued,

the children here,

"want to send all

and of course that cannot be done.

They could send them to Canada,

and we could take up to

our quota limit from Canada each month."
as he was willing to go,

That was as far

and he was relieved that

"the

enthusiasm is liable to wane at the end of a long
period

.

.

.

.

1,9

aNew York Times, "Report on a Gallup Poll," 2 0 June
1940, 1; and also 26 June 1940, 12.
9

Long Diary,

19 June 1940.
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Meanwhile,

Joesph Chamberlain,

National Refugee Service,
and Eleanor Roosevelt,
formed U.S.C.,

director of the

James McDonald of the PACPR,

honorary director of the newly

pushed for a relaxation of the quota

system in regard to refugee children.

To eliminate the

opposition based solely on the concern that such children
would become a public charge,

Chamberlain and McDonald

assured the State Department that they had financial
guarantees for each refugee child.

Mrs. Roosevelt

indicated that she had more than 15,000 families willing
to accept refugee children from Britain.10
Long could envision only the bureaucratic tangle
that such an approach would create.

"Each case," he

noted in his diary,
has to be handled individually and places found
for the children before they are given visas.
We do not want the Department responsible or
the Government in it except so far as granting
of visas exercises a control over the situation
in compliance with the law.
This could be a true headache,

Long argued.

There had to

be permanent arrangements and the children would "have to
have permanent immigration visas and the persons with
whom they placed will have to be responsible."

He was

worried that the rate of about 2000 per month was more

10

Christian Century, 57(3 July 1940): 94; New York
Times, 21 June 1940 1, 13; ibid., 22 June 1940, 7; ibid.,
23 June 1940, 2; ibid., 4 July 1940, 3; and ibid., 11
July 1940, 9.
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than the Department could handle.11

Long foresaw another

scenario that was even more dangerous.

Should an

American ship be torpedoed with refugee children on
board,

Long argued,

American public sentiment might swing

toward entering the war.

It was a thought which appalled

him.
The very surest way to get America into this
war would be to send an American ship to
England and put 2000 babies on it and then have
it sunk by a German torpedo.
That would shove
us right in the middle of the war, and that
cannot be done.
On top of the threat of war should such a catastrophe
occur.

Long believed that the pressure for visas would

surely increase. On this point he was adamant.

He wrote

that the State Department had "just tightened our
immigration restrictions for very good and sufficient
reasons,

and I am not going to recede one inch .

.

.

.

1,12

Apparently those who were committed to the rescue of
refugee children would not budge either.
organization,

A new

the American Women's Committee for the

Release of Mercy Ships for Children,

agitated for mercy

"Nothing appeared to be going right for Long at this
time.
"To add to my worries," he added in the same diary
entry, "the gardener told me last night that he wanted to
quit ."
Long's worries had just begun.
Long Diary, 19
June 1940.
12

Long Diary,

12 July 1940.
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ships to rescue the children.13

Raymond Clapper used the

Washington Daily News to issue a call for the White House
to save the children and to point out that the major
obstacle was the existing immigration laws and their
application by the State Department.14

The

administration's response to Clapper was a press release
which stated that handing out visas to children was much
"easier than transporting
ships."15

[them]

overseas aboard

Roosevelt would have to surrender,

however,

to

the considerable support that was given to a bill
introduced into the House of Representatives by Thomas C.
Hennings

{Dem., Mo.).

The bill would have amended the

neutrality laws so as to permit the use of American
unarmed and unescorted mercy ships to evacuate children,
provided a safe conduct was promised by Germany.
Although Roosevelt was concerned that the White House
would have to accept the responsibility for negotiation
of the passage of the mercy ships and would have
preferred that the matter be handled by the International
Red Cross,

the bill passed the House and the Senate and

13

19;

New York Times, 17 July, 13; 18 July,
23 July, 15; and 24 July 1940, 12.

17;

19 July,

"Clipping, "Let's Save Our Children," Washington
Daily News, 6 July 1940, container 202, Long Papers.
""Quoted in Feingold,

Politics of Rescue,

153.

became law on 27 August 1940.16
was not

"enthusiastic,

but noted too that

Long admitted that he

to say the least,

about the bill,"

"there is an enormous public demand

for saving those children."

He believed that he could

weather the storm and proceeded to attempt to limit the
bill

"so it will not be a perpetual rider on the

Neutrality Act and operate to bring in French,
German refugees etc.,
immigration laws."17

etc.

Poles,

to the vitiation of our

Perhaps the change in Long's tone

from an unwillingness to "recede one inch"

to an

unenthusiastic acceptance was partially because,

as David

Wyman suggested in Paper Walls, most of the refugees
affected by the Henning sponsored legislation were
British and few were Jewish.18
The refugee advocates,

however,

had not won the

battle.

Germany refused to guarantee safe passage and,

in fact,

sank in late August a Canadian liner,

Arandora Star,

which was carrying refugees and prisoners

of war to Canada.
the S..

the

Less than a month later another shi^,

£>. City of Benares,

carrying refugee children and

16

See New York Times, 27 July 1940, 1, 4, 12, and 17
August 1940, 7.
See also Congressional Record, 86, Part
9, 76th Congress, 3rd Session, 10028, ND Part 10, 1047110472 .
17

Long Diary,

18

Wyman,

13 August 1940.

Paper Walls ,12 6-127.
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adults, was also sunk, with a death toll among the
children of 79.19

Coupled with the hesitance of Long in

the State Department and a similar approach by some of
the consuls

(most noteworthy the Lisbon Consul)

to the

admission of children other than British children outside
the immigration quotas,

the loss of life in the Benares

sinking served to discourage the hopes of the rescue
advocates.
The State Department often would not grant emergency
visas even when there was a situation where the national
quota was not filled.

Although there was evidence that

15,000 Polish children and their mothers were in "extreme
distress"

in Spain and Portugal and the quota was not

filled for Poland,

the State Department did not act.20

The situation for refugees,

particularly Jewish refugees,

grew even more severe as 1940 drew to a close.

By 4

October 1940 a decree by the Vichy government had
authorized the internment in France of foreign Jews.
Many of those interned were forced into labor brigades
and died of cold,

hunger,

and disease.21

19New York Times, 2 September, 1; 23 September, 1;
and 27 September 1940, 1; see also "The Evacuation of
Refugee Children Our Responsibility," Social Science
Review, 14(September 1940): 543.
20

Wyman,

21

York:

Paper Walls,

129.

Lucy S. Davidowicz, The War Against the Jews
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976), 488.

(New
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Neither the State Department nor any official in the
United States government could claim ignorance.
International Red Cross,
conditions at Gurs,

for example,

reported on the

a camp in southern France.

the Red Cross Report indicated,

There,

12,000 people were

attempting to survive on 9,000 rations;
clothing,

The

and shelter,

and the basic necessities were in short supply.

One relief worker spoke of 800 individuals dying in the
five months of the previous winter,
children from their parents,

the removal of the

and the placement of the

children in special segregated camps where conditions
were really no better.22
Even with growing evidence that a horribj.2 situation
had developed for the refugees in Europe,
not act.

When Congressman William T.

Congress would

Schulte proposed a

bill to permit children under the age of 16 to enter the
U.

S.

on a visitors' visa and remain until conditions

would allow them to return home,

he faced a stone wall

and the bill was never reported out of the House Rules
Committee.23

22New York Times.
Paper Walls, 130.

28 December 1940;

see also Wyman,

"Congressional Record, LXXXVI, Part 9, 7 6th
Congress, 3rd Session, 20032; and New York Times,
August 1940.

9
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The President was besieged by the PACPR and by other
refugee aid agencies to help but little was done.

Rumors

were widespread that the Vichy government was planning to
permit the deportation of Jews to Eastern Europe;
State Department,

and the

apparently fearful that diplomatic

relations with France could be broken off, withheld
criticism.

Several relief agencies therefore met with

both Pierre Laval,
government,

the Prime Minister of the Vichy

and Philippe Petain,

the Vichy President,

in

order to find some way to mitigate the situation.
Laval, who thinly disguised his dislike for foreign
Jews,

argued that the Nazi government meant no harm to

the refugees and that the United States and Britain were
leaving the refugee burden mainly in the hands of the
French.

Petain offered little that was different.

The

representatives of the refugee rescue organizations then
contacted the U.
the U.
S.

S.

S.

State Department and discovered that

charge d'affaires to the Vichy government,

Pinckney Tuck, was asking the French authorities to

suspend both the deportation of three hundred children
and those refugees with immigration visas.24

24Donald Lowrie, The Hunted Children, (New York: W.
W. Norton, 1963), 204. New York Times, 5 September 1942,
3.
See also Brietmann and Kraut, American Refugee Policy
and European Jewry, 161-162
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Tuck was aware that only concrete proposals from
Washington would provide Laval with the chance to save
face and curtail international criticism at the same
time.

He therefore wrote to Washington that,

considering

the fact that few of the deported parents were likely to
"survive the treatment they are now undergoing,"
Washington should contemplate treating the refugee
children in a special way because "many of these children
may already be considered orphans."

He believed it

intolerable to leave the children in France25
Whatever the case.

Long remained wary of the

proposal to admit children.

"The appeal for asylum," he

wrote in his diary,
is irresistible to any human instinct and the
act of barbarity just as repulsive as the
result is appalling.
But we cannot receive
into our own midst ALL -- or even a large
fraction of the oppressed -- and no other
country will receive them or even a few
thousand, except that the President of Santo
Domingo offers to receive and care for 3,500
children
....
My personal reaction to that
is that Trujillo was trying to embarrass [Avra]
Warren.26
Long could not reconcile himself to take in even the
agreed upon 5000 of those he had referred to as

25

Quoted in Brietmann and Kraut,
Policy and European Jewry, 162.
26

Long Diary,

12 September 1942

American Refugee
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"derelicts,"27 and wrote that the "President definitely
declined to receive 15,000 of these Poles....

England

has much thinly occupied territory in Africa... but they
want us to take them here...."28
his approach.

Long had to reconsider

Attacks on the State Department,

and

Secretary Hull's suggestion that humanitarianism
sometimes made for good politics,29 helped persuade Long
to modify his approach and acquiesce.
Tragically,
.S.

it came too late.

The Portuguese liner

S.. Mouzenho left Baltimore on 7 November 1942 with

doctors,

nurses,

and child care experts on board and a

relief fund of $1,000,000 to pay for the initial passage
of 1000 children.

On that same day,

exit visas for children because,
Tuck,

Laval cancelled the

according to S.

Pinckney

he was upset about the unfavorable press releases

that had accompanied the departure of the ship. Only
"bona-fide orphans",

according to the new French policy,

would be allowed to leave and those children whose
parents had been deported but were not certified as
deceased did not qualify as
Originally,

"bona-fide orphans."

Laval's officials agreed to recognize only

100 children as

"orphans," but Tuck's pleas convinced the

27

Ibid.

28

Long Diary,

29

Ibid. ,

26 September 1942.

29 Sept 1942 .
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Laval government to increase the number to 500.

The

invasion of North Africa by Allied forces made all these
arrangements moot.
the invasion,

To meet the military threat posed by

the Germans moved into southern France just

one day before the children were scheduled to begin their
departure.

Although negotiations on behalf of the

children would continue for the next eighteen months,
efforts to rescue the "orphans"

failed.30

all

Of the 5,000

children who might have been saved from possible
destruction,

only 32 reached the United States.Jl

Those children who were fortunate enough either to
be smuggled out of France into Spain or to be hidden from
the Nazis by church officials in France still had a
chance.

The PACPR and relief agencies appealed to and

convinced Under Secretary Welles to permit refugee
children in Spain and Portugal to enter the United States
as part of the originally planned 5000; Welles also
agreed that, when possible,

the children's mothers would

be permitted also to enter the United States.
the Visa Division of the Department,

30

Wyman,
31

Long and

however.

See Lowrie, The Hunted Children, 223-224;
The Abandonment of the Jews, 37.

and

"Chronicle," Contemporary Jewish Record 5(December
1942), 634; see also "Minutes of the Meeting of American
Delegation," 25 April 1943, Bermuda Folder, container
203, Long Papers.
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successfully defeated any attempt to include mothers who
did not meet the prescribed procedures.32
Originally,

the Visa Division planned to allow into

the United States only those children whose parents had
been deported.

After the Division relented to pressure

from refugee relief organizations,

it still delayed

dispatching the necessary instructions to American
consuls; when it finally did so,

the instructions arrived

in Lisbon and almost immediately thereafter 31 children
sailed for America.

Twenty one more children who had

made it to Portugal also sailed for the U.S.

Those

children who made it to Spain discovered that the
American consulate was not as cooperative,

despite

appeals by Mrs. Roosevelt to Under Secretary Welles to
facilitate the departure of the children.

In total,

125

children left Spain and Portugal for the United States in
1943.

A dozen more came to the United States before the

war ended in Europe.
The failure to rescue,
mentioned,

save for the few already

the 60,000 children in Vichy France is but one

part of the broader Holocaust nightmare.
however,

It indicates,

what could have been done had the United States

adopted a more lenient and speedy visa program.

32

See Long to Welles,
Long Papers.

26 October 1942,

The role

container 202,
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of the State Department,

and particularly Breckinridge

Long and the Visa Division, was crucial.
not solely responsible.
events.

Abbe Glasberg,

Indeed,

But they were

one eye witness to these

a Catholic priest active in the

Oeuvre de Secours Aux Enfants.

believed that all 60,000

children could have been saved only if there had been
more enthusiasm by the proper authorities, more money,
and a less bureaucratic application of the visa system.33
Long himself admitted that the transportation of the
refugees was never a real problem when he wrote to Hull
in 1943 that the cost was

"not so large... perhaps $2,000

to $5,000 per person per year."34

Long and the State

Department were also aware that the Danish Ambassador,
Henrik de Kauffman,

had more than $20 million at his

disposal to aid in the refugee rescue effort.

Yet,

no

action was taken by the State Department.
Long and his friends at the State Department were
involved in two other offers to rescue refugee children.
The first concerned a Rumanian offer to transport aboard
two vessels chartered by the allies 4,500 children from
Constanza to Palestine.

The British agreed to the plan

with the provision that the children met their

"Arthur D. Morse, While Six Million Died: A
Chronicle of American Apathy (New York: Random House,
1968), 70.
34

Long to Hull,

23 March 1943.
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requirements.

The Antonescu regime offered to help in

getting the children through Rumania.

Long explained to

Congress that the plan collapsed because the "Germans got
wind of it and stopped it."35

He failed to inform

Congress that the State Department's vacillation may have
been as much a factor.

The United States was supposed to

supply $150,000 for the funding of the project
President's Emergency Fund,
such occasions,
time],

[the

which was designed for just

had more than $500,000 to use at this

but the State Department misled the British and

others into believing that the monies had to be
appropriated by Congress.
clarified,

By the time the matter was

the Gestapo had stepped in and stopped the

pre j ect.36
The second children's rescue effort involved an
offer by the Swedish government to negotiate with the
Germans for the release of 20,000 Jewish children.
the plan,
1943,

Under

approved by the British Foreign Office in May

the childien would remain in Sweden for the

35

U. S., Congress, House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings, Resolutions
Providing for the Establishment by the Executive of a
Commission to Effectuate the Rescue of the Jewish People
of Europe, 78th Congress, 1st Session, 1943, 30.
See
also Memorandum by R. Borden Reams to Under Secretary
Stettenius, 8 Oct 1943, container 212, Long Papers.

203,

"Ambassador Dodd to Hull, 21 April 1943, container
Long Papers.
See also Friedman, No Haven. 207.
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duration of the war while the British and American
governments would meet the expenses necessary to the
subsistence of the children.

Long,

R.

Borden Reams

(Long's principal advisor on Jewish questions in the
State Department's Division of European Affairs),
George Brant

(Long's executive assistant)

and

offered

bureaucratic and "political" reasons why the project
should be examined closely.

Their major reservation was

that the singling out of Jewish children alone might
encourage the Nazis to intensify their efforts to
eliminate the Jews.

After six months of delay,

the State

Department accepted in December the proposal which had by
that time included Norwegian children as well.
opportunity,

however,

had been missed,

The

because neither

the Swedish nor the Nazi governments seemed interested in
the project.37
37Morse,

While Six Million Died. 65-67.
For insight
to Long's opinions at this time, see his communications
with Dr. A London, the Netherlands Ambassador.
Dr.
London had expressed concern that he feared that the 6070,000 Jews who were removed from Holland and shipped to
Poland would most likely be "liquidated by the German
officials" upon their arrival in Poland.
Welles
responded to Ambassador London's concern by stating that
there must be "positive proof to this effect" and added
that the U. S. Government would be very interested in
whatever information that the Ambassador could provide.
Long concurred with Under Secretary Welles and had
indicated on several occasions that he believed that
often the atrocity stories were nothing more than
propaganda in order to concentrate public opinion
exclusively on the rescue of Jews. Alexander to Long, 14
May 1943, container 203, Long Papers;
Memorandum of
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Conversation, Netherlands Ambassador, Dr. A. London,
Under Secretary Mr. Welles, 13 August 1943, ibid.

and

Chapter 6
The Bermuda Conference

The State Department's ineffectiveness in its effort
to save European Jews can be understood only if one looks
at the total picture.

It appears to reveal a policy

which avoided rescue efforts.
appearance,

Because of this

the State Department and Breckinridge Long

came under increasing criticism.

Perhaps the most

impressive action taken to appease the critics was the
Bermuda Conference of April 194 3
On 20 January 1943 the British delivered a carefully
worded document to the U.

S.

State Department proposing

another "informal U ited Nations conference" to discuss
the rescue of

efugees who had already reached neutral

European nations.
conference.

No publicity was to attend the

The proposal was to help tlose refugees who

were comparatively safe, which is why the Bermuda
Conference was later referred to as a "hollow mockery" by
the rescue advocates.

The British also insisted that the

refugee question should not be treated as solely a Jewish
question.

Following a summary of all Britain had done

97

98
for refugees,

the document closed with an appeal to

Washington to relax its restrictive visa policy.
Washington was also asked to support the condition that
neutral countries would be guaranteed that any refugees
they accepted during the war would be repatriated at the
end of the war.1

Assistant Secretary Long was furious.

He believed that the British were attempting to show to
other nations that they were more willing than the United
States to help refugees.

He called the British

presentation mere "words and gestures."
the dispatch sent to the British,

Consequently,

and signed by Welles,

was clearly the effort of Breckinridge Long.

The closing

remarks in the dispatch reveal the resentment of Long and
Welles;

it stated that

"It is well known to us that a

campaign to undermine our foreign policy has been pursued
by certain elements in the British Government."2
As chief policy maker concerning European refugees.
Long had the responsibility to respond with a formal
reply.

He did this one month after the Braiish Secretary

for Foreign Affairs,

Richard Law,

had warned that public

opinion would force the British to act.

The response.

Memorandum Submitted to Bermuda Refugee Conference
by the World Jewish Congress, 14 April 1943, reprinted in
Tartakower and Grossman, The Jewish Refugee, 585-86; see
also Feingold, The Politics of Rescue, 190-91.
2

Long Diary,

29 January 1943.
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signed by Hull,

contained many discortions and

exaggerations in its descriptions of departmental policy
toward refugees.
of January 20

Of this reply.

Long wrote:

"Their note

(or thereabouts) was a plain effort to

embarrass us by dumping the international aspects of that
question plumb in our lap.
our Feb.

I picked up the ball and by

2 5 reply put the baby uncomfortably back in

their laps."3
In his response he wrote that United States
immigration laws had been applied as liberally as
possible,

a gross exaggeration.

He also implied that

since 1933 the United States had accepted into the
country 500,000 refugees.

In reality only about one half

that number had actually entered the United States.

Long

also cited as proof of the Department's good will the
United States internment of prisoners captured by the
British.

Even moi

amazing was Long's listing the

"relocation centers" housing 110,000 persons of the
Japanese race as Department efforts towards refugees
(amazing because many of those "refugees" were actually
citizens of the United States).

Nevertheless,

Long was

willing to accept a new conference as long as no new

3

Long's Draft with a letter from Long to Welles, 22
February 1943, container 212, Long Papers; Department of
State Bulletin, 8 (6 March 1943) : 202-204; Long Diary, 19
March 1943.
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commitments were expected. He did,

however,

call for the

revitalization of the Intergovernmental Committee

(IGC).

He would not accede to the argument that Hitler's primary
target was the Jews.4
Long's insistence that the IGC should be the
designated organization to handle the refugee problem is
indicative of his desire to keep control of the refugee
policy within the domain of the State Department.
Organized in 1938,

the IGC never had the full support of

its twenty-nine member nations.

It was difficult even to

convene its Executive Committee.

The IGC had done little

to alleviate the refugee problem;
that it was a part of the problem.

indeed,

it was argued

Long carefully

defended the need to continue the IGC even though most
refugee rescue advocates saw it as an ineffectual agency.
It was not surprisinc,

therefore,

that Long opposed

a new refugee conference based upon the idea of changing
the existing refugee rescue structure.

A new refugee

rescue conference could have obvious political benefits,
however,

the most noteworthy being the diffusion of

criticism; but the conference could be accepted only if
the IGC remained intact.

Long,

capitalizing on public

awareness stimulated by an eleven roint refugee rescue
proposal proclaimed by the World Jewish Congress at a

"ibid.

Madison Square Garden lally on 1 March,

1943,

preempted

the British initiative and released a public reply to the
British endorsing the call for the new conference.5
Meanwhile Long prepared for his meeting with Anthony
Eden,

head of the British delegation.

that Long did not want.

It was a meeting

Long distrusted Eden and

believed that Eden was still carrying a grudge against
him for the fact that as Ambassador to Italy Long had
opposed oil sanctions agains*"
Crisis in 1935.6

Italy during the Ethiopian

He was determined,

however,

to prevent

the British from stealing the spotlight and he knew that
the meeting was important.

He persuaded Hull and

Roosevelt to reject Eden's suggestions that Washington,
D.C.

serve as the site of the conference.

He wanted the

conference to be away from the prying eyes of the press.
A conference in Washington,

D.C.,

he argued, would expose

the State Department to "all the pressure which would be
coming from the locally organized groups in this country

5

New York Times, 4 March 1943, 9; Memorandum
Submitted to the Bermuda Refugee Conference by the World
Jewish Congress, 14 April 1943, reprinted in Tartakower
and Grossman, The Jewish Refugee, 586.
6

Long Diary,

16 February 1943.
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[like the American Jewish Congress]."

Bermuda was

finally the site agreed upon.7
Eden appeared to be more concerned about quieting
public opinion in Britain than fighting with an Assistant
Secretary of the United States State Department.

Eden

wanted the two nations to issue a joint statement in
favor of some kind of refugee rescue and was prepared to
announce that Britain was ready to admit 30,000 refugee
children to Palestine.
Atherton,

Hull suggested that Long,

Ray

Chief of the State Department's European

Affairs Division,

and William Strange,

British Assistant

Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, meet and work out a
joint statement.8
Long,

however,

could not rid his mind of the notion

that the British were attempting to belittle the refugee
rescue efforts of both the State Department and himself.9
Things did not go well.

Strange was unimpressed with

Long's self-proclaimed importance and Long himself,
perhaps approaching a physical collapse from all the

7

Long Diary, 19 March 1943.
Memorandum of a
telephone conversation, Long and FDR, 19 March 1943,
container 2 02, Long Papers; Representative Emanuel Celler
described Bermuda as "hermetically sealed." United States
Congress, House, Congressional Record, 78th Congress, 1st
Session, 1943, pt. 10: A2154.
8

Feingold/

9

Politics of Rescue,

Long Diary,

22 March 1943.

193.
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pressures that he had sustained in his three years in
handling the refugee problems,
his

admitted m his diary that

"reserves of nervous energies

[were]

lacking."

10

ate.

The final memorandum was to be sent without
reference to the IGC,

but at Long's insistence a proviso

was included that noted that future consideration should
not be precluded.

The memorandum sugge^ed that the

refugees should be divided into two groups;

tnose under

Nazi control and those who had escaped to a neutral
country.

Only the second group would receive

consideration of aid;
howe er,

for the group most in need of help,

"no steps to relieve them other than military

steps can be taken."11
memo from Hull,

On 23 March Roosevelt received a

wncten by Long, which discussed the

plans to counteract the "deep sentiments on the part of
the Jewish elements of our population."12

10Long Diary, 23 March 1943.
John Morton Blum quotes
Morgenthau as writing that Under Secretary Stettinius on
16 January 1944 "'was very frank in his views on Long's
failures'" and agreed with Morgenthau that Long's "only
remaining function" should be to work as a liason with
Congress.
Quoted in John Morton Blum, From the
Morgenthau Diaries: Years of War, Vol. Ill, 1941-1945
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967), 221-222.
Memorandum of Agreement; Atherton, Long, and
Strange, 22 March 1943, container 203, Long Papers.
12

Copy of Hull to FDR,
Long Papers.

23 March 1943,

container 203,
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First,

although he did not inform Roosevelt that he

was doing so.

Long packed the delegation which was to

attend the Bermuda Conference witn those who were close
to his beliefs about refugee matters.
Leader in the Senate,

Scott Lucas

and Sol Bloom (Democrat,

Assistant Majority

'Democrat,

New York),

Illinois)

Chairman of the House

Foreign Affairs Committee, were tne Congressional members
in the delegation.

Both were friends of Long and were in

agreement with his attitudes
R.

Borden Reams,

'oout the refugee problem.

Secretary to the Executive Committee of

the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees,
friend of Long,
the U.

S.

and a close

was chosen to serve as the Secretary of

delegation.

Robert Alexander,

Long's immediate

assistant, was also a part of the delegation.

The only

member of the delegation who was not a close friend or
associate of Long was George Warren,

Executive Secretary

of the PACPR.
Long probably breathed a sigh of relief when Myron
Taylor,
as well,

a key player in the Evian Conference and the IGC
declined to head the delegation.

Taylor claimed

the press of his other duties but he also believed that
little if anything would come out of the conference.
Taylor's ideas about the refugee situation were in direct
opposition to those of Long:

he believed that both the

United States and Britain needed to take in more
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refugees,

that all transportation costs should be borne

by the government,

and that there should be a guarantee

of refugee evacuation following the war so that other
countries would also be willing to open their door to
refugees .13
Long's old friend and the President of Princeton,
Harold W. Dodds,

accepted the post of the head of the

American delegation to Bermuda.
Dickstein,

Meanwhile,

Jamuel

Chairman of the House Immigration and

Naturalization Committee,

had written to Roosevelt

requesting that he be included in the American
delegation.

He argued that he was knowledgeable about

refugee matters and favored by Orthodox Jews in the
United States.14

Long preferred Bloom,

described three years earlier as

whom he had

"easier to handle" and

"terribly ambitious for publicity."15
Long would not heed the advice of Rabbi Wise, who
believed that Dickstein would be a better choice and more
representative of American Jewry; he wrote in his diary

203,

13

Copy of Taylor to Welles,
Long Papers.

3 April 1943,

container

14

2 April 1943,

container

Copy of Dickstein to FDR,
Long Papers.

2 02,
15

Long Diary,

20 June 1940.
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that Bloom was

"a representative of America" and that

appeared to him to be a sufficient enough answer.16
Just as Long thought all was well the British threw
him a curve ball.

In the midst of trying to convince

Jewish leaders that the Bermuda Conference was designed
to address all refugee problems,
ones,

not specifically Jewish

Whitehall attempted to get an invitation to the

conference for the Jewish Board of Deputies,
organization for British Jews.

a major

Long was upset.

He

reminded the British that the United States had
constantly held the position that the refugee rescue
crisis was general and not exclusively Jewish.

He also

was determined that the "no visitor" rule should remain
intact,

realizing that the United States would be

embarrassed should the British allow a Jewish
organization to attend while no American Jewish groups
were given that privilege.17
To add to Long's woes,

Rabbi Wise complained to the

State Department that, with thousands of Jews already
dead,

Long's description of the conference as

"primarily

exploratory" was a travesty and weakened the chance of

1€

Long Diary,

17

Long to Law,
Papers.

3 April 1943.
7 April 1943,

container 202,

Long
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anything concrete being accomplished.18

Philip Murray,

President of the Congress of Industrial Organizations,
warned the State Department that the conference could be
as futile as the Evian Conference and would instill
little confidence in the allied rescue efforts if it were
conducted in secrecy.19
The State Department publicly denied the charges of
Murray one week later.20

Meanwhile,

Long advised the

delegates to the conference to ignore the communications
of refugee advocates,

whose demands he termed as

"unrealistic" and not permitted under the IGC mandate.21
Privately,

Long

scribed the activities of Rabbi Wise

and the World Jewish Congress as

"so assiduous in pushing

their particular cause...that they are apt to produce a
reaction against their interest."22

He also worried

that Germany might use the protests.

Senate Resolutions,

and "broadsides bearing the names of high Government

"Memorandum Submitted to the Bermuda Refugee
Conference by the World Jewish Congress. 14 April 1943,
reprinted in Tartakower and Grossman, The Jewish Refugee,
587
19

2 02,

Copy of Murray to Welles,
Long Papers.
20

19 April 1943,

Department of State Bulletin,

container

8(26 April 1943) :

386.
21

Memorandum to American Delegation,
container 2 03, Long Papers.
22

Long Diary,

20 April 1943.

17 April 1943,
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officials" as propaganda to support their contention that
the Jews in the United States were the reason why the
United States was fighting the war.
neutral nations,
nations

such as Spain,

He concluded that

and many of the Moslem

"will be easy believers in such charges.

It

might easily be a definite detriment to our war
efforts.

1123

Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle divided the
proposals of the rescue advocates into three major
categories:
response,

(1)

those that called for a retaliatory

such as an attack upon a German city every time

an atrocity against refugees was confirmed;

(2)

those

that argued that the United Nations should issue another
warning that there would be war crime trials following
the war for massacres committed during the war;

and

(3)

those that promoted the idea of rescuing through Spain
and the Balkans those Jews who had survived the Germans.
In regard to the first proposal,

Berle contacted Air

Force officials and they informed him that all the
available air power was needed to achieve military
objectives.

That apparently ruled out for Berle the use

of reprisal air raids.

He also argued that such

reprisals would put the United States
with the Germans,

"Ibid.

"on a moral plane

which I think we should not wish to
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do."

Berle also did not believe in the feasibility of

the rescue of refugees through the Balkans and Spain,
although he was willing to give moral but not financial
support to a scheme to temporarily settle 100,000
refugees in Libya for the duration of the war.
remaining option,

The

a United Nations denunciation of

genocide which would hold all Germans accountable for
atrocities committed,

seemed in Berle's opinion to have

the best chance of success in halting the atrocities.24
Long disagreed with Berle's belief that a United
Nations declaration would cause a public response in
Germany and force the German government to discontinue
its activities.

He told Hull that he believed that such

a declaration would unite the Germans and cause them to
fight with renewed desperation.25

Hull apparently was

convinced by Long's argument and no declaration was
issued until a year after the Bermuda Conference.
In fact, most of Long's ideas prevailed at the
Bermuda Conference.

There was no emphasis upon the fact

that large numbers of the refugees were Jewish.

No new

monies were allocated to facilitate the rescue effort.
There was no modification in the existing immigration

24

2 02,

Berle to Hull and Long,
Long Papers
25

Long,

20 April 1943,

container

Long's response to Hull is mentioned in Brandt to
23 April 1943, container 202, Long Papers.
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laws.

And,

most tellingly,

arrangements for the

transportation of refugees was given such a low priority
that in fact there was no transportation policy.26
As late as November 1943 Long still used the "lack
of transportation" argument to support the fact that the
State Department was not issuing more visas.

He argued

that there were no neutral ships available and that none
had been available since Pearl Harbor and he also told
the House Foreign Affairs Committee that military vessels
could not be diverted from the war effort.27

Long either

lied or forgot that there had been an offer,

refused by

Long and officers in the War Department,

by U.

S. Army

authorities immediately prior to the Bermuda Conference
to transport refugees to the United States.28
It was the British who stated the real reason why
the State Department and the Foreign Office of Britain

26

A11 of these points were made in Draft of Letter of
Guidance, 13 April 1943, container 203, Long Papers.
Those views are repeated in Long Diary, 23 June 1943.
27

House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Hearings on Resolutions Providing For the
Establishment By the Executive of ?- Commission to
Effectuate the Rescue of the Jewish People of Europe.
78th Congress, 1st Session (1943), 22, 36.
On this
issue, David S. Wyman argues that there were neutral
vessels available throughout the war. Wyman, The
Abandonment of the Jews, 336, 337.
28

Memorandum of a Conversation. Long and Strong, 12
February 1943; Long to Strong, 22 February 1943; Long to
Atherton, 11 March, container 212, Long Papers.
See also
New York Times. 19 December 1943, 4.
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opposed any new plan to aid European Jews.

Richard Law

of the British Foreign Office put it succinctly at the
Bermuda Conference; Hitler might just release a large
number of the refugees in order to relieve himself

"of an

obligation to take care of these useless people." Reams
responded for the State Department by commenting that the
State Department would be against negotiating with
Germany anyway.29

This was a telling statement since the

United States had negotiated with Germany throughout the
war on such issues as prisoners of war,

exchanges of

civilian nationals trapped in enemy territory,

and

attempts to arrange a safe contact for refugee evacuation
ships.30
Also of note was the fact that Robert Alexander,

who

served as a "technical expert" at the Bermuda Conference,
informed Long and the members of the State Department
after the conference that he was convinced that Nazis
spies had infiltrated Jewish organizations and were
"really behind the

[Jewish]

pressure groups."31

One need

only to have listened to the comments by Sir Herbert

29

Minutes of the Bermuda Conference Sessions,
April 1943, container 203, Long Papers.
30

Wyman,

31

Abandonment of the Jews,

115.

Confidentiai Intradepartmental Memorandum,
Alexander to Long, 7 May 1943, container 203, Long
Papers.
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Emerson,

Director of the IGC,

to learn what,

progress would be made at Bermuda.

if any,

His input is

important since the British finally relented to Long's
demand that the IGC be considered the organization
responsible for handling all refugee affairs.
Emerson stated,

Nothing,

should be done in the way of rescue if

this in any way precluded "the efficient waging of the
war."

While this was the current excuse for inaction,

Emerson's version translated to an even more narrow
interpretation of the argument.

To the suggestion that

the Allies at least absorb as many refugees as Germany
would release,
the

(above)

he replied that this would not conform to

"test" and that the Allies should concentrate

on possibly rescuing a few thousand children in the
Balkans and France.32
Bloom and Dodds,

Comments made by Long's friends,

are revealing as well.

Both informed

the press that the Germans would never allow anyone out
of Europe unless it were "for good military reasons."33
The American delegation set off to E jrmuda with a
mandate to do basically nothing,
tampering with existing U.

S.

except to refrain from

laws.

They followed their

instructions well.

32

Emerson, Note on Measure for Rescue of Refugees, 24
March 1943, container 203, Long Papers; New York Times,
20 April 1943, 1.
33

New York Times,

18 April 1943,

11.
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The two delegations remained in Bermuda for twelve
days.

Only five correspondents representing various wire

service were permitted access to the island and no
reporters for individual newspapers were given access to
the conference.34
The British opened the conference by opposing Long's
insistence that the IGC should be revived.

Long cabled

that the British had already agreed to the IGC revival
and that it was the "ready-made logical and natural
instrument"

for the work that needed to be done.35

The

British were aware that the United States planned to use
the IGC as a means to avoid action since any plan of
rescue that the State Department could not object to
either for reasons of national security or because it
might hinder the war effort could be referred to the IGC
where nothing would be done.

The State Department could

then tell its critics that it was following the proper
procedure concerning the refugee

escue effort.

The British faced a different set of political
problems at home and a need t

change the procedure.

They suggested that the IGC broaden its scope,
its membership,

34

and revise its mandate.

Kunz to Clarkson,
Long Papers.
35

1943;

12 April 1943,

increase

In a change that

container 203,

Minutes of the Bermuda refugee Conference,
Long to Dodds, container 203, Long Papers.

24 April
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would haunt Long,

the mandate was changed so that the IGC

could negotiate with neutral and allied countries
preserve,

"to

maintain and transport refugees," but could not

negotiate with the enemy through neutrals.

The word

"refugee" was now defined as including all European
refugees and not just those leaving the Reich;

and the

power to negotiate with Germany woulc obviously be
rescinded.

Other changes,

too,

were recommended and

accepted.36
Long handled another proposal characteristic of his
style.

The British suggested a refugee camp in North

Africa,

a plan on which they proved relentless to wrest a

compromise from the Americans.

Long,

aware that to refuse

the British proposal would mean placing them in a better
light than his own delegation,
compromise.37
employing,
British:

Long,

in fact,

however,

eventually agreed to a

worried over his decision,

an argument often reserved for the

Moslem sensibilities.

The Bermuda delegates are sending us some
difficult questions to answer.I worked late
this
evening with Dunn, Atherton, Murray and
Brandt outlining our reply to the use of North
African territory for an internment camp for

36

Report of the Governments of the U. S. and the
U. K. from their Delegates to the Conference on Refugee
Problems, held at Bermuda, April 1943, container 203,
Long Papers.
37

Dodds to Long,
Papers.

21 April 1943,

container 203,

Long
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German, Czech, and sttceless Jews now in Spain.
To put them in Moslem countries raises
political questions whi .1 immediately assume a
paramount military importance -- considering
that of the population of 18 million behind our
lines 14 million are Mohammedans.
The
Mohammedan world is te.iding to flare up at the
indications that the Allied forces are trying
to locate Jewish people under their protection
in Moslem territory. . . .
Altogether it is a
bad tendency.38
Once more,

Breckinrida^ Long had found a reason for

refusing to revise the refuge rescue "policy" of the
United States State Department.

38

Long Diary,

23 April 1943.

Chapter 7
THE FINAL SOLUTION

The response of Breckinridge Long and the State
Department to the stories of Nazi atrocities against
refugees reveals at best a problem of bureaucratic
entanglement,

at worst the possibility of a deliberately

impervious attitude,

and in the least missed

opportunities.
When Henrik de Kauffman,
1943,

the Danish Ambassador in

informed the State Department that he had $20

million to aid in the rescue effort,

he also alluded to

the fact that he had knowledge of atrocities that were
committed daily by the Nazis against refugees.

The State

Department did not make use of Kauffman's offer of
assistance;

it also decided not to make public the

contents of Kauffman's letter mentioning the atrocities.
The rationale for the suppression of the contents of the
letter mirrored a vintage Breckinridge Long argument.
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Revealing the atrocities,

the State Department argued,

"work to the disadvantage of the Jews."1

might

Three years earlier.

Long had written to Adolph

Berle that he and others in the State Department knew
that refugees would be treated poorly by Hitler.

His

argument was that a State Department announcement to that
effect would be used either for political purposes by the
allied nations,

considered meddling in the affairs of a

sovereign country by the neutral nations,

or simply make

matters worse for the refugees under German control.2
Hitler had warned as early as January 1939 that
should a war aimed at exterminating the "Aryan peoples"
take place,

"it would not be the Aryan peoples which

would be exterminated,

but Jewry."3

Throughout the war

Hitler repeatedly promised the destruction of the Jews.
By September 1942 many were publicly announcing their
belief that Hitler was attempting to fulfill his 1939
prediction about the extermination of Jewry.4

York:

Washington

Quoted in Harold Flender, Rescue in Denmark,
Simon and Schuster. 1963), 240.

(New

2

Long to Adolph Berle, 23 February 1940, container
211, Long Papers. Long wrote in 1943 that "Jewish
activism may go against them...." Long Diary 20 April
1943 .
3

Quoted in the New York Times,

1 October 1942,

8.

"Perhaps the first unconfirmed report of the gassing
of Dutch Jews came in the BBC broadcast of German
novelist Thomas Mann in September 1942.
See Raul
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had unconfirmed reports from the Polish government in
exile that at Treblinka and other camps the Germans were
exterminating Jewish prisoners.

Jan Ciechanowski,

Ambassador of the Polish Government in exile,

was joined

by other officials of governments in exile in his plea
that Washington do something to retaliate against the
atrocities he believed were taking place.
several options.

He offered

He suggested that German cities should

be bombed in retaliation for the atrocities,

but

officials in Washington rejected that proposal because
they believed that such an action would encourage an
escalation in the terror
terror did exist).

(thus tacitly admitting that a

Another option,

a public warning to

Berlin to cease such activities, was considered by those
at State as something that would be conceived as an idle
threat and,
Germans,

considering the recent successes of the

an act of desperation.5

Lacking specific confirmed reports of atrocities
against the Jews,

the State Department adopted a policy

which closely resembled the approach of Long two years
before.

He had argued that singling out the Jews could

have repercussions in the form of a backlash against the

Hillberg, The Destruction of the European Jews
Quadrangle Books, 1961),
266.
5

N.J.:

Jan Ciechanowski, Defeat in Vichy
Doubleday & Co., 1947), 117-119.

(Chicago:

(Garden City,
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Jews and a diminution of the war effort.

Meanwhile,

Joseph Goebbels had come to the opinion by the end of
1942 that,

while the German program against the Jews made

headlines in the British and American press,

"both the

English and the Americans are happy that we are
exterminating the Jewish riff-raff."6
It is highly unlikely that anyone in the

State

Department would have been "happy" about the elimination
of

"Jewish riff-raff," yet there were those who were

inclined to disbelieve claims about German atrocities
that were being made by the international Jewish
community.

A case in point involved the report that came

from the World Jewish Congress
Dr. Gerhart M. Riegner,

(WJC)

and its director,

in July and August 1942.

Riegner was a Berlin refugee who had left Germany
shortly after Hitler rose to power.
Geneva,

studied international law,

He travelled to
and was asked to

become the Swiss representative for the WJC.

He quickly

established a reputation as a balanced and serious
scholar who seldom made statements without giving careful
consideration to their legitimacy.

In July 1942,

Dr.

Riegner learned from a German industrialist that Hitler
was planning to build gas chambers for the purpose of
exterminating millions of European Jews.

6

Quoted in Feingold,

At first

The Politics of Rescue,

169.
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incredulous,

Riegner immediately checked the credibility

of the industrialist,

Dr.

Edward Schulte.

He learned

that Schulte had on two previous occasions provided
accurate information to Allied intelligence.
inclined to believe Schulte's claims:

Riegner was

since the invasion

of Poland Riegner had documented mistreatment of Jewish
prisoners at ^ne hands of the Nazis and,
the WJC,

as director of

had daily received information of increasing

atrocities directed solely toward those unfortunate Jews
in Nazi occupied territories.

After examining the

evidence and consulting his friend and law school mentor
Paul Guggenheim,

Gerhart Riegner telegraphed the

President of the WJC,

Stephen Wise,

that he was convinced

that the Germans intended to exterminate 3-4 million
Jews,

probably through the use of prussic acid.

Although

he admitted that the information could not be confirmed,
he also noted that his informant was reliable.
Guggenheim,

more skeptical,

appended a note of doubt to

the telegram sent by Riegner,

but he also paved the way

for Riegner to present his case to the United States
Government.7
7Walter Lacquer and Richard Brietman, Breaking the
Silence (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1986), 1-8,
118 ff;
Monty Noam Penkower, The Jews Were Expendable:
Free World Diplomacy and the Holocaust
(Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1983), 63-64; Walter
Lacquer, "The Mysterious Messenger and the Final
Solution," Commentary (March 1980): 55.
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Riegner met and talked to Howard Etling,
was the U.

S. Vice Consul in Geneva.

Jr., who

Etling believed

that Riegner would not have approached the American
Consulate unless he was convinced of the accuracy of his
claims.

He persuaded the American legation to forward

Riegner's accusations to Washington; but Leland Harrison,
Etling's superior in Bern,

attached a disclaimer stating

that he believed it to be another one of those "war
rumors."

The State Department accepted Harrison's

explanation.

The only real controversy involved whether

or not Rabbi W ^e should be informed by the State
Department that it had received the information.

The

State Department voted to withhold the information from
Rabbi Wise.

Finally,

on August 28, Wise received a copy

of the report from British MP and Chairman of the British
section of the WJC,

Samuel Sydney Silverman.8

Meanwhile the State Department stuck to its decision
not to accept the claims put forward by Riegner and the
WJC unti_
did,

further corroboration was available.

however,

Roosevelt

hold a press conference to clear the air.

He was aware of stories of atrocities,

he claimed,

would welcome any further trustworthy information.

8

and he
He

Friedman, No Haven, 131;
Wyman, The Abandonment of
the Jews, 43, 44; Morse, While Six Million Died, 9;
Stephen S. Wise, The Challenging Years:
The
Autobiography of Stephen Wise (New York: G. P. Putnam and
Sons, 1949), 275
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did not mention either Riegner or the claims made by the
director of the WJC.9
The information he requested came within three
months.

In that period of time,

however,

the State

Department did not acknowledge what now appears to be a
mountain of evidence to support the claim originally put
forward by Riegner.

For example, when Rabbi Stephen Wise

contacted Sumner Welles to gain his support, Welles
expressed the opinion that was held by most of the State
Department officials and,

it appears,

Roosevelt,

that

those Jews who were transported east were sent to the
camps to build fortifications in order to fight the
Russians.

Meanwhile,

the European Division of the State

Department tried to squelch a telegram from the WJC in
London which implored Wise to go public with his
information.
Given more information from Jacob Rosenheim,
President of the Agudath Israel World Organization,
extermination, war under way in Poland,

that

Wise

unsuccessfully attempted through Supreme Court Justice
Felix Frankfurter to persuade Roosevelt to say something
publicly.

9

Welles met with a delegation,

Lacquer and Brietmann,

including Wise,

Breaking The Silence,

151.
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but the State Department failed to act or make any public
statement.10
As more information poured in to confirm the
or

icrinal claims of Schulte and Riegner,

the State

Department slowly moved to acknowledge that the
extermination of European Jews was in fact taking place.
Welles informed Wise in a hastily arranged meeting that
while the Rabbi could go public with its information,
State Department could not.

Accordingly,

the

Wise held two

press conferences on November 25th and 26th to rally the
world against the horror that was taking place.
same time,

At the

reports emerged from Palestine that confirmed

the existence of crematoriums at Auschwitz.11
Assistant Secretary Long,
place in the State Department,

aware of what was taking
did not appear to have

been directly involved in the Department's decisions
concerning the possession of evidence of a Nazi
extermination policy.

He was, however, much concerned

10

Wise to Frankfurter, 4 September and 16 September
1942, in Carl Herman Voss, ed. Stephen S. Wise; Servant
of the People:
Selected Letters (Philadelphia:
Lippincott, 1969), 249-251; Wise, The Challenging Years,
275; Wyman, Abandonment of the Jews, 45-46.
Long was
aware of what was going on.
See Long Diary, 12-13, 26
September 1942, for a recapitulation of the episode from
the State Department point of view.
11

New York Times, 11 November 1942, 10; ibid, 25
November 1942, 10; ibid., 26 November 1942, 16.
See also
Morse, While Six Million Died, 18-21 and Wise, The
Challenging Years. 275-276.
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with a letter he had received from Ales Hrdlicka of the
Smithsonian Institution and his response was indicative
of the approach prevalent in the State Department.
Hrdlicka had suggested as a postwar possibility for the
handling of the immigration of refugees from Europe that
the "favored Americas" should be considered.
not conceal his disgust for such a proposal,
acidly in his diary that he was

Long could
noting

"awaiting the descent of

the locusts."12
Two months later Long became more directly involved
in the issue of the State Department's response to Nazi
atrocities.

While still considering the rescue efforts

for the 1000 Jewish children left in Vichy France and
even more worried about a hostile attack in the press
upon the State Department in general and himself in
particular,13 Long was visited by Assistant Secretary of
State Dean Acheson,

Dr. Nahum Goldman

the Jewish Agency for Palestine),
Stephen Wise.

(who represented

and the son of Rabbi

The three ...ad appealed to Long to request

that the State "epartment give some aid to provide food
for the Jews m the Warsaw ghetto.

12

Long Diary,

13

Long agreed,

provided

21 July 1942.

Long Diary, 12, 13 September 1942.
The attack in
the press was considered by Long to be so vicious that he
only dropped consideration of legal action after his
friends advised that it would be unwise even to recognize
the "ravings of a Communist."
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there was a proper transfer of credit from the Treasury
Department for the State Department to authorize $12,000
a month to go to Portugal so that food could be provided
to the Warsaw Jews.14

Long immediately contacted Hull,

who agreed with Long that his decision was a "purely
political decision."

Long wrote that he "did not want

that policy along with others to serve as the basis for
antagonism towards us after this war...so that is our
policy."15

Long was also convinced that the United

States had to play the political game because of the
proximity between the British government and the "refugee
governments surrounding her in London."

If the U.S.

not appear to side with the refugee governments now,
wrote,

they would not support the United States

time comes to sit around the Peace table.
committed to the English point of view,

did
Long

"when the

They would be

whatever that

might be."16
In the end the catalyst for official recognition
that atrocities were taking place inside Poland came from
London.

In October 1942 a war crimes commission was

established and on 17 December 1942 an Anglo-American
declaration denounced the Nazi implementation of

14

Long Diary,

29 September 1942.

15

1 October 1942.

16

28 September 1942.

Long Diary,
Long Diary,
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Hitler's oft repeated intention to exterminate
the Jewish people in Europe.
From all the
occupied countries Jews are being transported
in conditions of appalling horror and brutality
to Eastern Europe.
In Poland, which has been
made the principal Nazi slaughterhouse, the
Ghettos established by the German invader are
being systematically emptied of all Jews except
a few highly skilled workers required for war
industries.
None of those taken away are ever
heard of again.
The able-bodied are slowly
worked to death in labor camps.
The infirm are
left to die of exposure and starvation or are
deliberately massacred in mass executions.
The
number of victims of these bloody cruelties is
reckoned in many hundreas of thousands of
entirely innocent men, women and children.
The statement continued that all the concerned
governments
condemn in the strongest possible terms the
bestial policy of cold-blooded extermination.
They declare that such events can only
strengthen the resolve of all freedom loving
peoples to overthrow the barbarous Hitlerite
tyranny.
They re-affirm their solemn
resolution to ensure that those responsible for
these crimes shall not escape retribution and
to press on with the necessary practical
measures to this end.17
Although the intent was humanitarian and the expression
noble,

the State Department press release was in fact a

continuation of the policy that the Roosevelt
administration had followed from the beginning of the war
in 1939.

Faced with evidence that extermination was

taking place and aware that silence in the face of such
evidence would be politically damaging following the end

17

State Department Press release,
container 212, Long Papers.

16 December 1942,
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of the war,
quiet.

the United States could no longer remain

However,

as late as one week before the press

release the members of the European Division of the State
Department had attempted to block any public
pronouncement by the administration.18

While the State

Department followed a policy in the time between the Nazi
invasion of Russia and Riegner's revelations which was
supposedly designed to protect the security of the United
States,

approximately one and one half million Jews had

been murdered.

In the three months between Riegner's

call for action and the State Department's press release,
approximately one million more Jews were killed.19

Even

after the press release the operative word was
"practical" and that came to mean a substitution of a
"rescue through victory"

stance for the "internal

security" position.
The "rescue through victory" approach stressed the
fact that little could be done to aid those unfortunate
enough to be in the hands of the Nazi officials.
Therefore the most rapid and most practical approach,
was argued,
possible.

it

would be to defeat the Nazis as rapidly as
Any other plan,

however well meaning, would

Brietmann and Kraut,
European Jewry, 159.

American Refugee Policy and

18

19

Hillberg,

Destruction of the Jews,

718.
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simply hinder the war effort.
Dodds,

In the words of Harold W.

leader of the American delegation to the Bermuda

Conference in 1943,
foolish,

such an approach "would not only be

it would be criminal."20

Reluctance on the part of the European Division of
the State Department to change policy reflected the
beliefs of Breckinridge Long.

Long delayed for almost a

year acceptance of the evidence and then qualified his
acceptance.
1943,

In an interdepartmental memorandum of May

Long acknowledged that he had received periodic

reports

"of the massacre of Jews,

infirm,

women,

and children."

including the aged,

He made it clear,

however,

that the "details as to the exact location of these
reported massacres and the actual number of lives taken
have not been reported."

And,

tellingly,

he noted that

"it may for present purposes be accepted as more than
Jewish propaganda that a large number of Jews had been
killed"

(italics added).21

Three months later the State

Department continued to treat reports as allegations.
Sumner Welles,

in a conversation with Dr. A.

Netherlands Ambassador,

sought

"proof"

London,

the

that the refugees

who were sent to Poland "were almost in their entirety

20

Department of State Bulletin,

VII

(7 April 1943),

351.
^Interdepartmental Memorandum, "Number and Location
of Refugees," 14 May 1943, container 203, Long Papers.
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liquidated by the German officials stationed in
Poland. "22
In March 1943 Congressman Celler and several Jewish
Congressmen met with President Roosevelt in order to
express their displeasure with the refugee policy as
promoted by the State Department and enforced with rigor
by Breckinridge Long.
them to the State Dep
Feingold,

Roosevelt's response was to refer
"tment.

One historian,

Henry

has claimed that Roosevelt was playing his

usual policy with the State Department.

Roosevelt was

not inclined to utilize the Department in the making of
foreign policy,

Feingold has written,

but he would often

use it as a "scapegoat for hostility generated by an
unpopular policy."23

Hull was aware of the way that

Roosevelt handled matters and he was very protective that
no further erosion would take place in the influence of
the State Department within the administration.

Long

also was cognizant of Roosevelt's gambits.24

22Memorandum of Conversation, Netherlands Ambassador,
Dr. A. London and Under Secretary Mr. Welles, 13 August
1943, container 202, in Long Papers.
"Feingold,
24

Politics of Rescue,

177-178,

See Long Diary, 16 December 1940, 22 April 1942,
and 4 September 1943.
See also clipping of St. Louis
Post-Dispatch. 5 September 1943 container 5, in Long
Diary.
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Long had previous _y attempted to counter criticism
of the State Department and himself when Assistant
Secretary Berle requested the State Department in 1940 to
release a condemnation of Nazi barbarity.

Long countered

with a memorandum that expressed sympathy with the "poor
people involved" but did not recommend that the State
Department should "make public expression of our
feeling."

it would be interference with the internal

affairs of another country,
not be able to implement

he argued,

and also "we would

^ur protest."25

Early in his career as Assistant Secretary Long
worked towards modifying action which could have been
taken on the reception of news of Nazi atrocity against
the Jews.

Stopping news at its source became after 1941

routine for Long,

since after the United States went to

war much of the information passed was transmitted by
diplomatic pouch and cable through the State Department.
This was a privilege which had been extended to Gerhardt
Riegner;

and the informacion could be withheld for

security reasons.

The State Department had on several

occasions been accused of suppressing information.26

25Long to EU,
Papers.
26

23 February 1940,

See Feingold,

container 202,

The Politics of Rescue,

179.

Long
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Long also was not above,
hide,

indeed did not attempt to

his belief that information favorable to the State

Department could be planted in the press.

He was not as

open about his desire to manage or manipulate unfavorable
information.27

On 7 May 1943 Long suggested planting an

article in Colliers to counteract unfavorable information
which had appeared casting a poor light upon the rescue
efforts of the State Department.28
It is not surprising,

therefore,

that the State

Department's response to a telegram by Leland Harrison in
late January 1943 was not as Harrison had hoped.
Harrison had forwarded news that reports of Nazi
atrocities were increasing.
for the State Department,

Sumner W«._les,

responding

informed Harrison that he

should no longer "accept reports" which had been given to
him by "private persons in the United States unless such
action is advisable because of extraordinary
circumstance."
informed,

Such private reports,

Harrison was

might cause the neutral countries from which

they came to retaliate by restricting the transmission of
"confidential official matter"

27

See Long Diary,

28

important to the United

17 February 1940;

3 April 1943.

See Confidential Intradepartmental Memorandum, 7
May 1943, container 203, Long Papers.
Feingold argues
that the State Department planted several spy stories in
popular magazines in order to enhance its position; see
Politics of Rescue, 334.
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States.29

It appears now that Sumner Welles was not the

author of that telegram to Harrison;

it is highly

probable that he only signed it as a matter of routine.
What is interesting is that the real sources of the
telegram were James C. Dunn,
Hickerson,

Ray Atherton,

and Elbridge Durbow,

John D.

all high level officials

in the European Division of the State Department and all
friends and associates of Long.30

Harrison requested

that Welles and the State Department reconsider the
import of the telegram,

reminding Welles how reliable

Riegner had been in the past.

Coming on the heels of

revelations in the New York Times that the Rumanian
government had offered to cooperate in the moving of
70,000 Jews to any place selected by the Allies and the
inadvertent discovery by the Treasury Department that the
State Department had ignored the Rumanian offer, Welles
complied with Harrison's request.31

In the meantime on

27 April 1943 the State Department cabled its approval to

29

Quoted in "The Morgenthau Diaries: VI,
Runaround," Colliers, 120(1 Nov. 1947), 23.
30

Wyman,
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The Refugee
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New York Times, 13 February 1943, 5.
For a
detailed account of the attempts by the State Department
to suppress news of the Final Solution, see "The
Morgenthau Diaries, VI, The Refugee Run-Around,"
Colliers. 120 ( 1 November 1947, 23 ff; Stephen Wise, The
Challenging Years, 275 ff; and Arthur Morse, While Six
Million Died, 3-11, 16-19.
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Harrison's request conditioned by the selection of which
cables to pass to Rabbi Wise.

Welles,

too,

figured out

State's attempt to suppress news of the "Final Solution,"
but was not in any position to act.32

Welles also

forwarded to Rabbi Wise on that same day Riegner's latest
message which detailed a relief and rescue effort to be
carried out by the WJC on behalf of Rumanian Jews and a
request for funds for orphans hiding in France trying to
escape to Spain and North Africa.

Riegner's plan

guaranteed that no money would end up in Axis territory
during the war.

Wise asked Welles to recommend to the

Treasury office that the WJC be granted a license to
deposit in Bern a substantial amount of money to finance
the rescue plan.33
The previous year the State Department had blocked
aid to the Polish ghettos on the grounds that such aid
would violate the Allied blockade and hinder the "rescue
through victory" effort.

At the same time,

it had

permitted the shipping of 15,000 tons of wheat and 3,000
tons of other goods to fight against starvation in Naziheld Greece.

A license was not granted to the AJJDC

until 11 December 1942.

The license came too late to be

32

Clipping St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 5 September 1943,
container 202, Long Papers; Clipping "The Washington
Merry-Go-Round,"
26 August 1943, ibid.
33
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of any assistance to many Polish Jews.

The WJC in early

1943 worked tirelessly to get the State Department to
allow food packages to be sent to individuals in the
Warsaw Ghetto and to those deported from Allied countries
to Eastern Europe.

The Board of Economic Warfare earlier

had moved to grant this privilege to both war prisoners
and civilian internees.
and the ICRC

The State Department,

the Board,

(involved in the Greek rescue effort)

delayed their response to the WJC.

all

The State Department

wanted proof that the Germans guaranteed its workability.
There was little doubt as to what the outcome of that
request would be.34

Long was aware at that time that the

Germans would not feed the Jews.
that Nazi behavior toward the

He wrote in his diary

ews was

"inhumane in the

extreme--almost incredible;" he expected little from
them.35
Furthermore,

the rescue mission of Rumanian and

French Jewish orphans revealed a growing rift in the
State Department and much of that division focused around
Long.

Following Riegner's advice that the rescue and aid

effort would pose neither an economic nor a military
problem,

Welles contacted Herbert Feis,

Department's economic advisor,

34

Ibid. ,

35

and Bernard Meltzer,

124-26.

Long Diary,

the State

29 September 1942.
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acting chief of Spate's Foreign Funds Control Division.
These two men had previous experience with Long and were
determined to keep the rescue possibility alive during
the time of the Bermuda Conference.
through Harrison,
Riegner.

Feis and Meltzer,

requested more information from

Riegner's response only sharpened the division

within the State Department.

Now it appeared that Feis

and Meltzer ran directly of afoul of Long,
Long's executive assistant,

and R.

specialist on refugee matters.
were Ray Atherton

Affairs).

Borden Reams,

Long's

Also aligned against them

(European Division),

(Near Eastern specialist),

George Brandt,

Wallace Murray

and James Dunn

(Political

All supported the same refugee policy as Long

and agreed with Long's argument that foreign currency
would be available to the enemy and would therefore
relieve the Germans of any responsibility for caring for
the people who were under their jurisdiction.36

Long

and other members of the Department had been aware for
more than six months that Rumania had not taken care of
its Jewish population and had been sending out peace
feelers.37

Rumania's tentative peace actions all but

36

Penkower, Jews Were Expendable, 12 9; Brietman and
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37

Long Diary,
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removed the plausibility of the economic warfare
argument.

Treasury Secretary Morgenthau,

upon being

informed that the State Department was resisting aid to
Rumanian Jews because it would aid the Nazi war effort,
stated that such a position by the State Department
appeared odd because the "State Department was usually
among those who scoffed at economic warfare in other
connections. "38
Long's Spec_al Division finally made one concession
to Meltzer;

he could present his case to the Treasury

Department only if it utilized the economic warfare
argument.

Wnile ^ong apparently believed that bringing

in the Treasury Department would be politically
expedient,

adding one more bureaucratic process to an

already bloated procedure,

it in actuality marked the

beginning of the end for Long and his stringent visa
policy.

John Pehle,

the Foreign Funds Controls Director

for the Treasury Department,

received Riegner's report on

15 June 19.3 and could see no real objections that could
be raised against the plan.

One month later a meeting

between State Department and Treasury Department

"Quoted in "The Morgenthau Diaries, VI, The Refugee
Runaround," Colliers, 120( 1 November 1947): 23, 62.
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officials revealed that there would be more delay.39
Borden Reams,

R.

as Long's specialist on refugee matters,

at

first argued against the plan on the basis of its
inability to keep U.
enemy.

When Josiah E. DuBois,

General Counsel,
U.

S.

S. money out of the hands of the
Jr.,

Treasury's Assistant

presented a foolproof plan for keeping

dollars from getting into German hands,

however.

Reams fell back on the argument that since only 30,000
places remained under the British White Paper there was
no place available for the refugees to go.40
officials,

unimpressed by Reams'

Treasury

argument, moved to

implement the plan.41
Rabbi Wise,

anxious to get the plan in action,

met

with Roosevelt 22 July 1943 and the President endorsed
the plan.

The next day Morgenthau informed the Rabbi

39

Penkower, Jews were Expendable, 12 9; Wyman,
Abandonment of the Jews, 180.
For the best account of
this entire episode, see Arthur Morse, While Six Million
Died, 73-86.
40

See Reams to Long, 7 May 1943, container 203, Long
Papers, for a further indication that this had been the
argument of Long and Reams fully two months before the
State Department and Treasury Department meeting.
41

For additional information about the licensing
issue, see Graham H. Stuart, Memorandum: Confidential,
Special War Problems Division, 27 May 1944, Division of
Research and Publication, War Records File, in container
204, Long Papers; Reams to Stett_nius, 8 October 1943,
container 203. Long Papers; Wyman, Abandonment of the
Jews, 180; Penkower. Jews Were Expendable, 13 0; and
Morse, While Six Million Died, 67.
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that the plan could begin as soon as there was an
exchange of cables between the State Department and the
American legation in Bern.

A week later the Treasury

Department informed the AJC that it was prepared to begin
the plan.42

Hull informed Morgenthau that the plan was

permissible since no funds would fall into enemy hands
and that the State Department would notify the legation
in Bern that such was the case.

A full month passed

before the State Department cabled its approval of the
Riegner plan.
What had happened?

It now appears that Long and his

associates had not abandoned their opposition to the
plan,

even though it was approved by the President,

using the discredited economic warfare argument,

and,

delayed

the implementation of the program by almost seven weeks.
Harrison,

who initially supported the Riegner plan, was

confused and inter-Departmental politics played no small
part in the confusion and delay.
receiving notification

Harrison,

upon

.rom the Treasury Department that

the license would be issued,

followed proper procedure

and waited to receive the proper instructions from his
immediate superiors.

When he received the State

Department cable on 28 September,

42

he informed the State

Wise, The Challenging Years, 277-278; Stuart
Memorandum, 27 May 1944, container 204, Long Papers.
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Department,

not the Treasury Department,

of problems that

might develop with the British government.

Ten days

passed before the Treasury Department learned of
Harrison's reservations and it wasn't until 28 October
that Randolph Paul,

acting for Morgenthau,

copy of Harrison's cable.

Paul,

received a

furious at the delay,

informed Breckinridge Long that for a number of reasons
British clearance of the project was not necessary.43
In the meantime,

Long,

aware that Reams opposed any

plan which he thought might benefit
enemy aliens,"

"a special group of

still insisted that the IGC should be the

proper agency for handling such a matter.

He nonetheless

cabled Harrison 26 October 1943 and informed him to go
ahead with the plan.44

Harrison delayed.

He consulted

the British and discovered that they still opposed the
plan by Riegner.

Harrison requested authority from the

State Department before he would implement a plan that
was directly in defiance of the British.
Morgenthau was aghast at the annecessary delay.
While he chastised Pehle for his failure to consult the
British,

he also told his associates that the real

"Stuart Memorandum, 27 May 1944, container 203, Long
Papers; Long Diary, 28 October 1943; Wyman, Abandonment
of the Jews, 181.
44

Breckinridge Long Memorandum,
container 2 03, Long Papers.

26 October 1943,
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problem lay with the British and Hull's associates;

and

he approved a letter to Hull by Pehle after modifying the
harsher portions of the communication.
cable the U.

S. Ambassador to Britain,

Hull was asked to
John G. Winant,

and to request that Winant tell the British that the plan
was fully safeguarded.45

Winant delivered the

information and relayed to the State Department that the
British had really opposed the Riegner plan because there
was no place to put the refugees should they be rescued.
At this point Meltzer learned from Josiah DuBois at the
Treasury Department that the British had been aware of
Riegner's proposed rescue plan from the time that he had
first suggested it.

It seemed apparent to Morgenthau's

assistants that individuals at State had deliberately
blocked Riegner's plan and obfuscated at every possible
instance.

Morgenthau's assirtants now pushed for the

Secretary to argue for the removal of the refugee issue
from the authority of the State Department.

Morgenthau,

obviously hoping to avoid a showdown cattle with Hull,
arranged for a meeting to take place 2 0 December between
Morgenthau and his assistants and Hull and his
assistants.

He sent a memorandum to Hull explaining the

problems that had arisen.

45

Stuart Memorandum,
Papers.

When he arrived at the

27 May 1944,

container 203,

Long
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meeting, Morgenthau,

accompanied by Pehle and Randolph

Paul learned that Long had cabled Winant two days before
expressing "astonishment" that the problem had occurred.
On that same day,

Long had cabled Harrison in Bern and

instructed him to issue the license to Riegner and the
WJC.

Harrison reported that he personally handed the

license to Riegner.

It had been eight months since

Riegner had requested funds for the rescue and aid
effort.
Hull's action and reactions at both the 20 December
1943

and the 11 January 1944 conferences with Morgenthau

and other Treasury Department officials revealed the
confusion that existed at the State Department.

In the

December conference Hull claimed that the "fellows down
the line"

(his subordinates),

a mess of things.

although sincere,

In the January conference Hull

appeared to be totally confused.

He had been briefed by

the Treasury Department on the issues,
be unprepared.

had made

but he seemed to

He was unable to introduce four of the

five State Department officials who had been active in
the rescue-refugee issue and who were attending the
conference with him,

and he grudgingly agreed with

Morgenthau's assessment that the State Department's
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rescue record was

"most shocking."

Morgenthau wrote that

Hull appeared to be "simply bewildered."46
Following the conference, Morgenthau reached the
conviction that he could no longer leave the matter of
the refugees in the hands of the State Department.

He

knew that Roosevelt's record in relation to Hull was that
he would not move against him and he was convinced that
"Hull wouldn't move on Long."47
Morgenthau saw Long as the key to the situation.
Long had attended the 2 0 December conference and
Morgenthau had confronted him directly with the fact that
several people saw him as a hindrance to the rescue
plans.

When Long attempted to place the fault on the

people "down the line"

in both departments and

specifically singled out Meltzer as responsible for
spreading rumors about anti-Semitism in the State
Department,

Morgenthau turned to Long and said "Well,

Breck...we might be a little frank.

The impression is

all around

are anti-semi; ic."

[that] you,

particularly,

Long denied that he was anti-Semitic and asked Morgenthau

46

Quoted in Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries,
see also "Morgenthau Diaries," 65.
47

Quoted in Blum,

From the Morgenthau Diaries,

22 0;

220.

143
to use his

"good offices to correct that impression,

because I am not. "

48

Long had assured Morgenthau at the December
conference that the State Department was not of the same
opinion as the British in regards to the rescue of 70,000
Rumanian Jews.

Morgenthau managed to get Hull to ask

Long to send over a copy of a telegram sent to Bern by
the State Department in February 1943 .
protested but finally agreed.
his protest,

Long at first

There was good reason for

and Morgenthau knew why.

The February

telegram showed an attempt by the State Department to
suppress news about the Final Solution and,
damning,

even more

referred to an earlier telegram which contained

Riegner's report reconfirming the Nazi extermination
plan.

Although Long complied,

true copy of the telegram.

he did not give them a

He simply provided a summary

which omitted all reference to the previous telegram (the
one which contained Riegner's report).
Long,

Unfortunately for

Josiah DuBois of the Treasury Department had seen a

true copy of the February telegram and the Treasury
Department requested and received the next day a copy of
• •
«
49
the telegram containing Riegner's report.

48

219;

Quoted in Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries,
see also Wyman, Abandonment of the Jews, 185.
49

Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries,
Abandonment of the Jews, 185-86.

22 0,

218,

221; Wyman,
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Outraged by the circuitous reasoning of the State
Department,
process,

frustrated over more delays in the licensing

alarmed at the ineptness bordering upon

incompetence of Hull in the refugee situation,

and

totally lacking any trust in either Long or his
associates at the State Department, Morgenthau decided to
press Roosevelt for the removal of the refugee problem
from the hands of the Sti-te Department.

Randolph Paul

prepared the report which Morgenthau took to the
President.

Titled "Report to the Secretary on the

Acquiescence of This Government in the Murder of the
Jews,"

the report was harsh.

It accused the State

Department of willfully failing to rescue the Jews from
the time in August 1942 when it had learned of the news
of a Nazi extermination policy.

Much of the blame was

levied at Long and his associates.

They were accused of

using national security to hold immigration below the
available quotas and frustrating private programs which
could have saved Jewish refugee lives.

The report also

included the two important telegrams and implied that
Long and the State Department used the IGC to delay
action on refugee rescue efforts.
least,

It was,

to say the

a damning report.50

50Blum,

From the Morgenthau Diaries,
Abandonment of the Jews, 187, 188.

22 0-221; Wyman,
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What is odd is the fact that Long,

who kept records

of everything in which he was involved and copies of
almost everything that crossed his desk,
of these events.
memorandums,

Neither in his diaries,

left no records
letters,

and notes at that time nor in subsequent

records did Long either defend or explain his actions.
In November 1943 Breckinridge Long appeared before
Congress and gave his public answer in defense of his
refugee policies.

Chapter 8
CONCLUSION

Dissatisfaction with the inaction of the State
Department by refugee advocates led,

in July 1943,

to a

meeting in New York of an Emergency Conference to Save
the Jews of Europe.
Juli

The meeting, which took place 20-25

at the Hotel Commodore,

resulted in the creation of

an "Emergency Committee to Save the Jewish People of
Europe"

(Emergency Committee).

had one goal:

to persuade the United States government

to create an agency,
Department,

The Emergency Committee

independent of th-? U.

S.

State

to rescue the Jews of Europe.

Breckinridge Long faced several dilemmas.

He

supported one of the decisions reached by the Bermuda
Conference;

the recommendation that the IGC be

restructured and strengthened.

He also did not want to

see the Emergency Committee's recommendations adopted
because that would eliminate the necessity of the IGC.
In addition,

he had seen the Visa Division removed from

his Special Division in September and transferred to
Under Secretary Stettinius's office.
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This injury to his
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pride followed an ever greater disappointment when
Stettinius was promoted instead of Long to be Under
Secretary of State following the departure of Sumner
Welles.1
Long handled the situation as well as he could,
attempting to exert damage control until the very last.
He hand delivered the order for transfer of the Visa
Division to the Secretary,

telling him that he felt he

had "won all the battles and the war in the immigration
fight" and that he was delivering a smooth operating
program.

He also informed the Secretary that he

[Long]

had been subjected to "vilification and abuse" by the
"radicals" because of his
fair administration of the issues involved and
while I would not quit in a fight I felt that
having won I would take this instant to be
relieved o^ that work...1 wanted to be free of
that job after three and a half years of
handling the most complex and worst job in the
Government.2
Long turned over the Visa Division before Stettinius
officially received his appointment because he did not
want it to appear thac it had been "taken away from me
and I had been repudiated."3

^ee Departmental Order,
container 212, Long Papers.
2

Long Diary,

3

Ibid.

13 September 1943,

13 September 1943.
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In fact,

however,

that had been the case.

Long

confided to his diary almost two weeks later that he was
happy to be finished with the "executive detail concerned
with the supervision of the very active division;" he was
obviously tired and felt defeated.4
Meanwhile,

Congressional support for the Emergency

Committee's proposal was strong enough that the House
Committee on Foreign Relations, with Long's friend Sol
Bloom as Chairman,

called hearings to determine whether

the Emergency Committee's proposal should be acted upon.
Before he gave his testimony,

Long wrote to Senator

Elbert D.

that a new committee would

Thomas

(Dem.,

Utah)

simply "interrupt the relationships already established
within the Intergovernmental Committee and might affect
adversely the contribution this Government can make
towards a solution of the refugee problem."5

Long was

disturbed by the powerful backing that he believed the
Emergency Committee had in Congress.
said that nothing had been done.

To stifle those who

Long authorized the

release of the "Final Report" of the Bermuda Conference
on the day following the introduction of House
Resolutions 350 and 352.

4

Long Diary,

5

1943,

He did not achieve what he had

26 September 1943.

Long to (Senator Elbert D.) Thomas,
container 203, Long Papers.

27 October
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wished.

Richard Law,

a member of the British delegation

to the Bermuda Conference,

believed that he understood

the State Department's action in Bermuda.

He recalled

twenty two years later that the Bermuda Conference had
been a "facade for inaction."
response,

he had

When pressed further for a

responded "there were no results that I

can recall."6
It should not be surprising that Long believed that
the hearings to establish a separate organization for
refugee rescue were a result of
direct attack upon himself.

"Jewish agitation" and a

He managed,

however,

to

convince the members of the Foreign Affairs Committee
that the State Department and the Intergovernmental
Committee had done everything possible to save the Jews
of Europe.7
Long began his testimony by attempting to overwhelm
the Congressmen with statistics relating to the many

6

Quoted in Arthur D. Morse,

While Six Million Died,

63 .
7

Long Diary, 1 January and 24 January 1944; U. S.
Congress, Committee On Foreign Relations, Hearings on
Resolutions Providing or the Establishment by the
Executive of a Commission to Effectuate the Rescue of the
Jewish People of Europe on House Resolutions 350 and 352
and Senate Resolution 203. 78th Congress, 1st Session, 9
November 1943, 35.
Hereafter House Rescue Commission
Hearings; United Press teletype [sic]. 10 December 1943,
in container 203, Long Papers.
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accomplishments of the Roosevelt Administration relating
to refugees.

He praised the work of the IGC,

stating

We decided that the thing to do since we already had
a number of governments party to this, was to
revitalize it, reform it, reinvigorate it, hitch up
the horses to the old surrey and go down the road
with it.
That was the best instrument we had at
hand.8
In his praise of the actions of the IGC,

Long never let

the Congressmen forget that the State Department had
always placed first the furthering of the war effort.
believed no need for a new agency existed;

He

the IGC and

the State Department were doing the best that could be
done considering the circumstances.

Long's praise of the

work of the IGC is curious because at the same time the
hearings were conducted the IGC had in essence tabled a
recommendation,

suggested by Roosevelt to Under Secretary

of State Edward R.

Stettinius,

that additional refugee

camps and offices,

staffed by Americans,

established in various countries

could be

o aid Jewish refugees

attempting to escape the Nazis.9

8House Rescue Commission Hearings,

32.

^Stettinius to Long, 11 November 1943, container
203, Long Papers.
See also Wyman, The Abandonment of the
Jews, 156.
For other examples of Long's knowledge that
the IGC usually did nothing about rescue plans handed to
it by the State Department, see Long to [George] Brandt,
12 August 1943, container 203, Long Papers; Memo of a
Conversation, Long with [Peter] Bergson and [Ira]
H-rschmann, 13 September 1943, ibid.;
Penkower, The
Jews Were Expendable, 135, 136.
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His four-hour testimony on 26 November,
insistence in executive session,
were,

however,

given at his

is revealing.

There

glaring anomalies and misrepresentations

in Long's testimony.

Will Rogers,

Congressman from California,

Jr.,

Democratic

noted for example that the

IGC did not even have offices in the United States.
Long's credibility was seriously weakened by Congressman
Rogers'

questions regarding the correctness of the IGC's

right to negotiate with enemies through neutral parties.
Instead of using his standard argument against
negotiation in any way with the Axis,

Long surprised

rescue advocates sitting on the Committee when he
insisted that the IGC had the power and that members of
the IGC were "given plenary authority to do whatever they
can within and without Germany and the occupied
territories. "10
The question of negotiation was asked in order to
determine if a new agency would be nothing more than a
duplicate of the _3C and if so a solution for the current
dilemma of whether or not to form a new agency.

Long's

astonishing revelation came as a relief to some of the
Congressmen and the assistant Secretary offered to

10

House Rescue Commission Hearings, 32, 35;
"Statement on the Hon. Breckinridge Long," Jewish Comment
No. 23 (24 December 1943): 4;
New York Times, 24
November 1943, 13.
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arrange for the public release of the IGC's new mandate
but the new mandate did not provide for negotiation in
any way with the Axis or satellite states.11

Ample

evidence proves that Long consistently opposed such
negotiations.

He set the ground rules for the American

Delegation to Bermuda and had stricken such a proposal
from the delegation's agenda.12

Moreover both the

preliminary and final reports from the Conference
specifically rejected such negotiations.
had described the idea as
friend,

R.

E rden Reams,

absolutely "foolish."13

Harold Dodds

"criminal," while Long's
had claimed that it was
Long apparently convinced the

Committee that a new agency was not necessary,
Committee,

in fact,

resolutions.

and the

asked Long his opinion on the

He carefully avoided suggesting that the

resolutions should be voted down.

Instead he replied

that while its passage might be construed as a

"See United Press Teletype [sic], 10 December 1943,
in container 2 03, Long Papers; see also "Statement of the
Hon. Breckinridge Long," Jewish Comment, 4.
12

"Memorandum to American Delegation," 17 April 1943,
container 203, Long Papers; House Rescue Commission
Hearings, 32.
"Department of State Bulletin, 8(17 April 1943) :
351; "Report to the Governments of the United States and
the United Kingdom from their Delegates to the Conference
on the Refugee Problem Held at Bermuda, April 1943," in
container 203, Long Papers.
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repudiation of the work of the State Department and the
IGC,
I think it would be very dangerous to vote it
down, very unwise, in a way.
I think this is a
very important moment in the history of the
refugee movement, and I think the Jewish people
are looking forward to this action and the
decision of the Committee and I think if an
entirely negative action were taken here it
would be misconstrued and might react against
the Jewish people under German control.14
At this point the Committee members must have
wondered just what Long wanted.

He obviously could not

tell them to kill the resolution and survive the public
uproar which would follow.
the measure.

Their answer was to shelve

They did not know,

however,

that the

disengenuity of the testimony that Long gave would lead
to the creation of a new agency.
In his testimony Long had referred to a "neutral
Government" which had asked the Germans to release 20,000
Jewish children from Germany.

This neutral Government

was to care for the children and the United States was to
help in the expense.

Long clain^d that the German

government had not shown any indication that it would
accept the proposal.

He also stated that

"nonetheless,

we are trying to get the neutral government to continue

"initialled note in Long's files, container 203,
Long Papers; see also House Rescue Commission Hearings,
34-35; United Press Teletype [sic], 12 December 1943, in
container 203, Long Papers.
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in its activities."

The Swedish government had offered

in early 1943 to negotiate with the Germans for the
release of 20,000 children who would remain in Sweden for
the duration of the war provided that the U.

S.

and

British governments shared in the cost of their upkeep.
Although the British approved the plan in May,
American government never acted upon it.

the

Long and his

supporters in the State Department delayed approval for
six months because they believed it was wrong to limit
the offer to Jewish children.

After the British offered

to include Norwegian children,

the State Department

finally approved.

By that time,

however,

neither the

Swedish nor the German governments showed much interest.
Long had continued to oppose any negotiations that would
include the "enemy."15
Long also informed the Committee that there was
support for a plan to remove 100,000 children from Axis
authority and the use of some type of

"rehabilitation"

program by neutral countries
where they could get food and where we would
put the food where the children could be
nourished and brought back to something like a
normal state of physical well-being and, when
they had been there for 2 or 3 months and had
gotten strong, they would go back home and some
other children would come in.

15

House Rescue Commission Hearings,
Morse, While Six Million Died, 66-67.

29;

see also
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This plan had actually been in operation for some time,
but had not included Jewish children and other children
held in Axis Europe.16

Another error made by Long during

his testimony was his claim that the U.
about 580,000 refugees
regime."

S. had accepted

"since the beginning of the Hitler

When Representative Mundt expressed shock about

the number.

Long reassured him that

"except for the

generous gestures...made with visitor and transit visas
during the awful period,
intact."

the immigration laws remained

Rescue advocates claimed that the actual number

was about one half the one given by Long and that many of
those refugees were not Jewish.17
Long also attempted to tie together the admission of
refugees and the unavailability of shipping.

He claimed

that fewer than 200 individuals a month could be
accommodated with the transportation facilities that were
available.

Long had to be aware that such a claim was a

total misrepresentation of the facts.18

He even claimed,

16

House Rescue Commission Hearings, 36; "Statement of
the Hon. Breckinridge Long," Jewish Comment, 2.
17

House Rescue Commission Hearings, 23, 29,40, 41;
see also New York Times, 27 December, 11, and 31
December, 14, 1943.
See APPENDIX for the number of visas
issued between 1933 and 1944.
18

House Rescue Commission Hearings, 22.
The argument
seems specious when quite often rescue ships did not
carry as many individuals as they could:
for example, in
June 1943 a refugee rescue ship arrived in Philadelphia
with space for 600 passengers but only carried 30
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when questioned by Representative Mundt about the
relationship between visa issuance,

available shipping,

and the possible limitations imposed by the State
Department on the number of visas available,

that

"the

movement of people had stopped."19
The claim of the State Department in May 1943 that
German submarine warfare was a real threat to the
shipping of refugees20 no longer applied by the time Long
gave his testimony to the Committee.

Indeed,

Winston

Churchill had announced to the United States Congress at
the same time that the Atlantic Ocean was free from any
menace from German submarine warfare.21
Long also used the argument that even humanitarian
gestures,

such as attempts to send food to the refugees

in Nazi held territory, were of no avail.
food," Long explained,

"If you send

"the Germans will take it and you

contribute to the welfare and fighting strength of the

passengers.
See Friedman, No Haven, 194.
At the Bermuda
Conference discussions were held of the approximately 40
passenger vessels available from neutral countries for
refugee rescue and those discussions were in Long's
files; see "Confidential Memorandum for the Chairman,"
Morning and Afternoon Sessions, 20 April 1943, Bermuda
Conference, container 203, Long Papers.
"House Rescue Commission Hearings,
20

Deoartment of State Bulletin,

21

Washinqton Post,

2 0 May 1943,

22.

8(22 May 1943) :
1.

456.
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German Army."22
special advisor,

Interestingly,

R.

Borden Reams,

Long's

had explained to Under Secretary

Stettinius a month before that it had been considered
unwise to permit

"food to go to the oppressed Jews of

Europe" because many of them "were acnually enemy
aliens. . . . "23
In reference to a question about the Struma incident
in which 7 00 refugees had drowned off the coast of Turkey
because che authorities had turned them away in an
unseaworthy vessel.

Long's response was that although the

incident was

"terrible"

do happen."

Moreover,

it was

"one of those things that

that incident was concerned with

the Palestine situation.

Long added,

and he stated he did

not believe the refugee question and the Palestine
question were to be considered together.
importantly,

More

Long's testimony became more strident and he

blamed the Jewish interest groups in the United States
for the hampering of the refugee relief efforts.
had,

he argued,

They

exaggerated the plight of the Jews and

thus excluded the suffering of other racial and ethnic
groups.

He was of the opinion that he and other members

of the State Department could not

22

"exclude persons from

House Rescue Commission Hearings,

23

36.

Copy of Memorandum of Reams to Stettinius,
October 1943, in container 203, Long Papers.

8
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our sympathy and our sympathetic attention if they are
not Jews . "24
The Coinmittee,

and particularly Sol Bloom, was so

pleased with Long's testimony that he requested that Long
permit his testimony and the new mandate of the IGC to be
made public.

In December his observations were made

known to the public.25

Almost immediately refugee

advocates went on the attack :'6
Long would not admit defeat.

In fact,

he believed

so thoroughly in the impressiveness of his testimony that
he expressed surprise at the attacks that were launched
against him.

He admitted to the American Jewish

Committee and the PACPR

^ although 580,000 visas had

been authorized that number was not the actual number
granted.27

It should be remembered that it was State

Department policy that limited the number of refugees
permitted to enter the country; not action by Congress.
Long,

then,

24

could not deny that the so-called "relative

House Rescue Commission Hearings,

44-45.

2S

Diary,

New York Times, 11 December 1943, 1; see also Long
12 December 1943 and 1 January 1944.

26

New York Evening Post, 11 December, 1, 3; 13
December, 23; 14 December, 1; 20 December, 1, 3, 1943.
See also New York Times,. 27 December, 11; and 31
December, 14, 1943.
27

Joseph Proskauer to Long 28 December 1943 and Long
to Proskauer 14 January 1944, container 203, Long Papers;
Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews, 203.
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rule" which kept out an incalculable number of refugees
was the result of State Department executive policy.

Yet

he remained adamant.
In fact,

he maintained not only his innocence but

also his correctness.

In correspondence with his old

friend and one time lieutenant,

Avra Warren,

Long was

outraged that his integrity haa been questioned.
I made a statement to the Foreign Affairs
Committee of the House which was subsequently
printed and in the course of a long four-hour
inquisition made "everal statements which were
not accurate -- for I spoke without notes, from
a memory of four years, without preparation and
on one day's notice.
It is remarkable that I
did not make more inaccurate statements.
But
the radical press, always prone to attack me,
and the Jewish press have turned their barrage
against me and made life somewhat
uncomfortable.... Anyhow I have written to Bloom
a letter for the Committee which ought to
straighten it out -- but it will not, because
they have to have somebody to attack.
On that
basis I have been pilloried as an enemy of the
Jew and as trying to discredit them.
Their
agitation depended on attacking some
individual, otherwise they could have no
publicity.
So for the time being I am the
bull's eye.28
The public outcry against Long begged for his
removal from the control of the refugee issue.

Since the

testimony coincided with his growing controversy with
Morgenthau over the Riegner proposal,

this marked in

essence the end of Long's influence over refugee matters.

28

Avra Warren to Long, 15 December 1943, Long to Avra
Warren, 7 January 1944, container 203, Long Papers; Long
Diary, 1 January 1944.
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He would remain in the State Department as an assistant
Secretary for almost another year,

serving in that

capacity primarily as a liaison with Congress.29
When the War Refugee Board was created in January
1944,

Long attempted to put as good a face as he could

upon what was in essence a repudiation of his and the
State Department's handling of the refugee problem.
himself admitted to one of his critics that
security of the years to come,

Long

"In the

it may appear that the

screening process was too rigorous."

But he also argued

that the process was necessary and "it avoided
incalculable damage to the refugee cause."30
the end,

however,

he wrote his assessment of the War

Refugee Board in his diary 10 days later.
do I have not done I can not imagine."
the political side of the issue.
was

"good," he wrote,

because,

Proud to

"What they can

He could see only

The War Refugee Board

"for l-vjal political reasons"

as he saw it

there are 4 million Jews in New York and its
environs who feel themselves related to the
refugees, because of the persecutions of the
Jews, and who have been demanding special
attention and treatment.
This will encourage
them in the thought the persecuted may be saved
and possibly satisfy them politically -- but in

29

Long Diary, 1 January and 24 January 1944; see also
Israel, ed., The War Diary of Breckinridqe Long, xxiv.
30

Long to Proskauer,
Long Papers.

14 January 1944,

container 203,
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my opinion [the Board] can not save any
persecuted people we could not save under my
recent and long suffering administration.31
This diary entry reveals many of the failings of Long's
administration of the refugee crisis.

Even at this point

he failed to admit the existence of the Final Solution.
He likewise appeared to have believed that only Jews were
interested in saving innocent victims of the Nazi
atrocities.

Of his own record Long believed

it [spoke] for itself.
I am satisfied and happy....
I do not consider myself a scholar -- rather a man
of action -- perhaps somewhat slowed up by age.
Of his immediate supervisor,

Stettinius,

Long believed

the man
no scholar, and is definitely a man of action - but his methods, background and lack of
experience grated on me.
There is no
alternative in such case but separation. . . .
And we have arrived at the end of thac
chapter.32
His only regret while in office.
end of his service to the Government,

Long wrote at the
was

that a radical and selfish clique should have
seen fit to attack me with viciousness and
violence while I was engaged in a humanitarian
activity and saving the hundreds of thousands
of refugees.

31

Long Diary,

24 January 1944

32

Long Diary,

4 December 1944
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Long concluded:
itself."33

33

"On that the record speaks for

Indeed,

Long Diary,

it does.

31 August 1945
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